

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040049-1

28 OCTOBER 1980

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9369

28 October 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 39/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF  
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION  
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9369

28 October 1980

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 39/80)

### CONTENTS

#### INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Terror Campaigns May Lead to Confrontations Among States  
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1-7 Aug 80) ..... 1

#### ALGERIA

- French-Algerian Cooperation in Matter of Immigrant Workers  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 Sep 80,  
JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Oct 80) ..... 10
- New Prospects for Cooperation With France  
French-Algerian Precedent,  
by Abdelaziz Barouhi

#### IRAN

- Ex-Empress Recounts Fall of Monarchy  
(PARIS MATCH, 15 Aug 80) ..... 15

#### IRAQ

- National Assembly Speaker Interviewed on Current Issues  
(Na'im Haddad Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,  
18-24 Jul 80) ..... 25

- Briefs  
Yacht Purchase ..... 35

#### LEBANON

- Phalange Victory Over NLP, Plans for Partition Analyzed  
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jul 80) ..... 36

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

Treasurer General Reports on Public Finances  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Sep 80) ... 46

SYRIA

Confrontation With Opposition Escalates  
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jul 80) ..... 51

Briefs  
Turkish 'Alawite Emigration 54

TUNISIA

Climate for Upcoming Barre Visit Auspicious  
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Sep 80) ..... 55

Hard Times for Hedi Nouira  
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Sep 80) ..... 57

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TERROR CAMPAIGNS MAY LEAD TO CONFRONTATIONS AMONG STATES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Aug 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "Middle East: Maelstrom of Liquidations Warns of Confrontation Between Regimes"]

[Text] Political violence is a world existing by itself in which the sound of bullets and the blood of victims are entwined with the policies of the regimes and the struggle among the security agencies.

The past 2 weeks have witnessed a high tide in acts of assassination that have horrified the Arab world, shed noble blood, made dear faces disappear and given Zionism a weapon with which to slander the Arabs, their struggle and their regimes.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will try in this report, written by its political correspondent in Paris and by its Beirut bureau, to paint a picture of the bloody week.

But has the Arab baptism with blood ended or does more blood have to be shed?

In less than 2 weeks, nine Mideastern political figures have been murdered and assassinated:

A daring, but abortive, attempt has been made to assassinate Iranian ex-Prime Minister Shahpor Bakhtiar at his house in Paris.

Salah al-Bitar, a former Syrian prime minister, was assassinated at the door of his newspaper offices in Paris.

Machineguns riddled the body of Riyad Taha, the Lebanese press doyen, in an almost public act of assassination in Beirut.

Musa Shu'ayb, an official of the Lebanese Ba'th Party, has been murdered.

An Arab diplomat was blown up in a bomb explosion in Abu Dhabi.

"Ali Tabatabani, an Iranian opposing the regime, was assassinated in his house in a New York [sic] suburb.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(Nehat Erim), a former Turkish prime minister, was assassinated in an Istanbul suburb.

(Kemal Turklur), a prominent Turkish unionist leader, has been assassinated.

An abortive assassination attempt has been made against 'Isam al-'Attar, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, in his exile in West Germany.

The chain of violence that has engulfed the Middle East, beginning with the sands of the Gulf, with Beirut and Paris and ending with New York, has perhaps not ended yet. Perhaps there are other victims awaiting their turn on the assassination lists carried by the intelligence officers of the security agencies--officers who are, perhaps, themselves included in these lists.

It may be difficult to explain the motives and incentives behind the wave of assassinations that has horrified the area. It is more correct to say that there is no explanation for these black waves that rise every now and then. Violence, generally, is the tendency to use force against definite or indefinite targets to realize a political goal.

Ultimately, violence is tantamount to the use of intimidation and terrorization for political purposes. In any case, Che Guevara--one of the prophets of revolutions in our modern age--did not believe in individual, or even mass, violence because the victims may be innocent and must be ultimately spared for a nobler goal, namely revolution.

Syrian Intelligence's Activity

The wave of violence and assassinations has escalated since Col Rif'at al-Asad, the younger brother of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, made his famous threat to pursue the Syrian opposition men at home and abroad and to liquidate them.

Even though al-Bitar's assassin has not been identified for certain, all the signs indicate that this great and prominent Arab thinker who has contributed to the philosophy of Arab nationalism throughout nearly 50 years was one of the definite targets because of his intellectual and political weight. In a period of violent political tremors boiling under the Syrian surface, al-Bitar seemed as if he could be the alternative on which all the Syrian opposition factions could agree in a transition period, should a change occur in Syria.

Salah al-Bitar realized that he was a target of the Syrian intelligence agencies which have shown such interest in Paris in recent weeks that they drew the attention of the French security authorities. But al-Bitar was slow to take precautions, perhaps out of his belief that an old man of his years and his status would not be subjected to harm.

The attempt at Bakhtiar's life and then the assassination of al-Bitar within a period of 3 days aroused the resentment of the French public opinion and the rage of the French security and policemen.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Yes Bakhtiar has escaped his 5 attackers. But a French policeman was killed in the incident and another is lying in the hospital in critical condition. Meanwhile, an old French woman met her end when she opened the door of her apartment to find out what had happened in the building's inner lobby. But the bullets of the armed men did not give her the chance.

It is interesting to note that the owners of the building in which Bakhtiar lives and Bakhtiar's neighbors have hastened to ask him to leave the building because their life has become endangered.

The fact is that Arabs and all politicians, students and workers with Mid-eastern features are no longer desired by many landlords these days.

Strict French Precautions

As for the French security men, they have threatened to arrest any foreigner bearing arms, even if he is a diplomat enjoying immunity, and to present him to the judiciary without permission from the government.

At the same time, they are trying to acquire more effective weapons to face the automatic weapons carried or acquired by foreign diplomats operating under diplomatic cover.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI diplomatic correspondent says that the French authorities have completed their secret security measures and precautions in the past few days and that they have now almost complete information on most of those coming recently to Paris by air from the various capitals and who seem to have appointments to settle their accounts with others or with each other.

The public and secret police force assigned to protect foreign targets, such as foreign embassies, offices, organizations or figures, constitutes 10 percent of the general police force. This percentage is estimated at present at nearly 3,000 uniformed policemen and plainclothesmen.

The French agencies specialized in secret control and pursuit are numerous and highly efficient.

D'Estaing and Deep-Rooted French Traditions

It seems clear that the strict security precautions have come as a result of frank instructions from high-ranking French officials, led by French President Giscard d'Estaing and Minister of Interior Christian Bonnet.

The two officials have stressed that the government is determined to take the measures necessary. The minister was pressing his lips while talking in an angry tone about the determination of the agencies to foil every attempt to turn the French capital into an arena for shedding the blood of political refugees, regardless of what country they belong to.

The minister means by this that France does not wish to see its capital turned into another Rome or London. This was a reference to the physical liquidation incidents that have terrified the two capitals in the past 3 months when



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the Libyan security agencies liquidated a considerable number of the opposition leaders living in exile.

However, the French president has stressed that France wishes to remain a safe refuge and asylum for all those persecuted in their own countries.

In comment on what d'Estaing has said, the French diplomatic circles point out that France has had deep-rooted historical traditions in offering asylum to Mideastern figures for almost 100 years. At the outset of the 20th century, Paris was, as it is today, the center of dozens of politicians, journalists, thinkers and intellectuals who had fled the persecution of their governments or of the colonialist powers colonizing their countries.

Perhaps this statement is true to a large degree. But the simultaneously shameful and saddening difference is that those refugees were rarely exposed to harm at the hands of their governments, even though those governments did keep an eye on them, even though those governments were extremely oppressive and isolated, even though they did not claim that they were "progressive" or revolutionary or bearers of these long and wide bundles of sparkling political slogans.

Anderson Under Protection of His Country's Intelligence

What is also surprising here is that while a man of Salah al-Bitar's weight was falling dead with the bullets of his country's security agencies, John Anderson, the third U.S. presidential candidate, was moving in Paris and the other capitals he visited in a bullet-proof car supplied by the FBI and was being given protection during this tour by the men of this U.S. investigation agency. Anderson has not been exposed to assassination on the hands of the FBI men because he is determined to run against Jimmy Carter, their present president, or because he has rebelled against Ronald Reagan, his party's candidate.

This is how the countries which we describe as "reactionary" treat their political opposition leaders. How do we treat ours?

Salah al-Bitar continued to bleed for 2 hours in the small lobby at the top of that high building on (Ouche) Street after the murderer had deposited very courageously a bullet in the head that has nourished and nurtured the Arab political thought throughout 50 years.

Yet, and despite all the precautions, Paris is no stranger to crimes of political violence among foreigners, especially since their number is relatively large and since they are varied and come from different countries.

There are, for example, 5,000 Iranians living in Paris alone and several thousand others living in its suburbs. What has happened in their country in the past 2 years has turned these Iranians into interfighting personalities and factions and personalities, ranging from Bakhtiar to General (Owaysi), who are accused by Iran of hatching the recent coup attempt, and ending with those who are still loyal to religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At present, the security agencies belonging to Mideastern countries and organizations are lurking for each other. Some of these agencies have a long experience in work and observation in Europe and have well-organized networks through which coordination is established and information is exchanged, perhaps even with other security agencies.

Intelligence Wars

The secret world of intelligence is governed by no law in its operation, relations and activities. However, it must be said that the political relations are reflected either negatively or positively on the relations between the security agencies.

An ordinary act of assassination or liquidation or an ordinary friction may perhaps be enough to ignite a long-lasting and exhaustive intelligence war that could claim tens of men and officers as its victims. However, the ultimate victory will belong to the more cohesive and better organized, experienced and distinguished, both qualitatively and numerically, agency.

If the Mideastern intelligence networks operating in Europe are in a state of alert and readiness in preparation for any emergency, in complement to the deteriorating relations between the area's states and in reflection of the deteriorated domestic conditions in more than one country, then world Zionism and its agencies do not lack the means to incite interfighting among these Mideastern agencies or to exploit a tragedy, such as the murder of Salah al-Bitar, to damage the reputation of the states involved, especially if they are Arab states.

The French media, including the press, radio and television, for example, have spared no detail in exploiting Salah al-Bitar's assassination, not only to project President al-Asad's regime in the repugnant manner in which these media have presented it but also to go beyond with the aim of undermining all the Arabs and to tell the French public opinion directly or indirectly that this is what the Arabs do to their leaders, politicians, thinkers, intellectuals and journalists.

Jewish Deputy Jean Pierre-Bloch stood under the dome of the General Assembly after al-Bitar's murder and the attempt at Bakhtiar's life to demand expulsion of the Arabs "because they shed the blood of the French on French soil."

Arab reputation in West Germany is no better than it is in France. As soon as 'Isam al-'Attar, the grand master of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, was subjected to an attempt at his life, the widespread West German media quickly picked up the thread to talk about the conditions in Syria.

The assassination attempt was an "intelligent" occasion to put President al-Asad's regime and the situation in Syria with all its details on the media's dissection table. The result was not flattering for the Arab reputation among the West German public opinion.

If we return from Europe to the Middle East amidst the wave of political assassinations, the picture seems very vague.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is easy, for example, to point the finger of accusation at the Iranian intelligence in the murder of Iraqi diplomat Husam Muhammad in Abu Dhabi with a bomb. It is also easy, for example, to discern the motive behind hijacking the Kuwaiti planes. But in a country like Lebanon, which is ruled by anarchy and the rifle and where 25 organizations, militias and armies are engaged in interfighting, it is difficult to determine the agency or the murderers who carry out such acts.

Political conclusion remains the only means of distinction and of measurement and political connections remain to be the leads in solving the mysteries of a murder.

It is futile, for example, to look for the assassins of Riyad Taha. But it is easy to follow the threads until we reach the fingers of those holding the threads behind the scenes.

Amidst this extreme ambiguity and this intensified brutality in the assassinations and murders in Lebanon, local journalists and foreign correspondents find themselves the only losers in the game of death as long as their only weapons continues to be a pen in the face of a gun with a silencer, an M-16 rifle or a Klashnikoff machinegun.

Two prominent Lebanese journalists were killed this year. The first was Salim al-Lawzi who died a slow death by terrible torture and mutilation and the second was Taha Riyad who had never thought that he would be killed by the bullets of a mobile road block when he had saved the lives of hundreds of the sons of the two main sects that had been kidnapped by road blocks.

#### Journalists Follow Orders

It is a big risk to be a journalist or a correspondent working in Beirut. You are lucky to get an anonymous ultimatum or warning to stop working. All you have to do in such a case is obey the orders.

Some of them have had no warning. Robert (Feifer), the correspondent of the West German magazine STERN, tried to defy the cordon of secrecy surrounding the person and work of Wadi' Haddad, the late Palestinian leader, and started to gather data on Haddad fit to be material for a book. (Feifer) was killed in his car.

Berend (Dibosman), a REUTERS correspondent, was wounded seriously last June. Tim (Lewelyn), a BBC correspondent, left Beirut a few weeks ago and (Georges Stocklin), a LE FIGARO correspondent, has received a similar warning.

Beirut is a jungle of reinforced cement and thousands of fingers are lurking between its columns and doors and in its streets, corners and turns to pull the trigger at any moment. Between these and those [sic], tens of agencies working for several states are making their moves. As it is difficult to read Beirut's architectural map because of its extreme intricacy, it is also difficult to explain the crisscross lines on its political map.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Box on Page 23] Salah-al-Din al-Bitar

[Text] Baghdad has refused but to honor Salah-al-Din al-Bitar. This time, al-Bitar did not come to Baghdad to visit but came from exile borne on the shoulders to rest next to comrade martyrs of the Arab nation--a nation for which he has lived and struggled--who had preceded him to martyrdom.

Iraqi President Saddam Husayn sent a special plane to bring al-Bitar from his exile so that Baghdad may host him in its soil.

Michel Aflaq, al-Bitar's lifelong comrade on the path and the [Ba'th] party secretary general; 'Izzat Ibrahim, the Revolution Command Council deputy chairman; the members of both the National and Regional Commands and large crowds of Iraqis, Arabs and friends and disciples of the prominent martyr were on hand to receive al-Bitar's body, march in his funeral procession and lay him down in his grave.

[Box on pp 24-25] Riyadh Taha: Martyrs' Doyen

[Text] Beirut--His smiling and friendly face was one of the faces with which Beirut felt optimistic and good despite the wounds, tears, blood and pains of the five-year march. Last week, he also turned into a deep bleeding wound in the body of the widowed city.

Nobody had expected any hand to reach out to harm him because he had good and excellent relations with all the Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab political and combatant sides.

This is why the assassination of comrade Riyadh Taha, the Lebanese press doyen, was a stunning surprise to all, especially since it has come at the peak of the physical assassinations and liquidations that have left a twisting thread of blood starting in the Gulf sands, passing through the sidewalks of Beirut and ending on the sidewalks of Paris.

Riyadh Taha spent at the court of her majesty [the press] nearly 40 out of his 53 years of life as amateur, professional, editor, reporter, correspondent, chief editor, newspaper owner, establishment owner and doyen for 13 years.

In his youth, he was a revolutionary in his political work and his writings. Among the sons of his generation, he was the one most strongly aware of the countryside's backwardness, tribalism and political feudalism.

For his rebellion, he was subjected to strong persecution and failed or was made to fail in the elections repeatedly and was attacked and beaten very cruelly.

His local Lebanese interests and his journalistic activities did not cloud his Arab vision. From his early youth, he was open to the pan-Arab [al-qawmi] thought and was eager, whenever he visited Damascus, to meet with the Ba'th Party leaders and intellectuals and whenever they came to Lebanon as visitors or exiles, they were also eager to meet with him.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

'Abd-al-Nasir's personality and his fast steadfastness [presumably rise] dazzled Taha. Inasmuch as he rejoiced at the meeting between the Ba'th and 'Abd-al-Nasir in the unity between Egypt and Syria, he was bitterly disappointed in the [subsequent] secession.

Riyad Taha played a side role in the efforts to reunite 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Ba'th. When the attempts failed, Riyad turned greater attention to his growing press establishment in the 1960's.

Riyad Taha as Doyen

But this attention dwindled rapidly when he was elected the Lebanese press doyen at the peak of this press' influence and proliferation in the Arab world. The concerns of the press union overwhelmed the concerns of the journalistic profession and thus his newspaper and his magazine disappeared.

Then came the civil war with its catastrophes and tragedies and Riyad Taha waged it as a zealous combatant, but a combatant defending the freedom of expression and of the Lebanese citizen. He took part in tiring efforts to reunite the Muslim and Christian Lebanese.

His position as press doyen enabled him to play a unique role as a result of his eagerness to maintain his political and professional neutrality and through his concern for every sectarian color--a concern that persisted despite his awareness of the deep social and political persecution which his Muslim sect, the Shi'ites, has suffered--especially in al-Hirmil in whose barren landscape he grew up.

His position also gave him the opportunity to bolster his Arab and international relations as a result of his eagerness to maintain his neutrality and balance on the basis of his precise understanding of the sensitive nature of the Arab relations.

However, this did not prevent him from expressing at times his frank opinion in his private meetings or on the occasions in which he had the opportunity to speak.

Riyad Taha censured, for example, the Marunite Lebanese Front for its intransigent positions obstructing the reunification of Lebanon. However, this did not prevent him from maintaining his traditional relations of friendship with the Marunite leaders.

Riyad Taha feared, for example, that Lebanon would be partitioned and that the Lebanon's sectarian conflict would extend to Syria which, in turn, would be partitioned.

Riyad Taha thought that his firm relations with the various intricate, conflicting and crisscrossing Lebanese, Arab and Palestinian sides permitted him to express every now and then general observations from the position of a "responsive friend," as he used to say.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thus, Riyad Taha criticized at times the Lebanese armed manifestations in the street, some of the Palestinian actions and some of the Syrian actions and even censured the Arabs for their "failure" to extend a helping hand to save Lebanon. Recently, he showed interest in the creation of a fund to rescue the south--a fund in which expatriate southern Shi'ite business men would participate.

Who Killed Riyad Taha?

But why was Riyad Taha killed?

The last act performed by the Lebanese press doyen was his visit to Baghdad, by virtue of his position, to attend the 14 and 17 July revolutions celebrations. It has been said that he had been "advised" to decline the invitation but that he was eager to respond to the invitation.

Did Riyad Taha pay his life as the price for failing to heed the advice?

Did Riyad Taha pay his life as the price for the observations that he expressed?

Or did Riyad Taha go as the fuel for the fire of physical liquidations amidst an intricate, ambiguous and incomprehensible jumble of political and sectarian balances?

Was Riyad Taha killed because of tribal differences in his remote and isolated mountain area?

Perhaps a question mark will paint the face of any Lebanese if you ask him the previous questions. But when you face him with the last question, he shakes his head sarcastically without answering, as if his silence is the most eloquent answer:

Was Riyad Taha the press doyen or a tribal chieftain?

May God have mercy upon the soul of Riyad Taha, the doyen of the press and the doyen of the martyrs.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

8494  
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

FRENCH-ALGERIAN COOPERATION IN MATTER OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS

New Prospects for Cooperation With France

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2347

[Article: "New Prospects For Cooperation With France"; passages enclosed in slantlines in boldface]

[Text] The climate of relations between Algiers and Paris has improved following the agreement which the two negotiators, Mr Mohamed Benyahia, minister of Foreign Affairs, and the French minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Jean Francois-Poncet, have just reached after difficult, lengthy and in-depth negotiations.

The thorny problem of the return to Algeria of Algerian workers now in France was a stumbling-block. The fact that it has been resolved under conditions satisfactory to both governments proves their common political desire to restore a climate of confidence to their relations. The agreement, signed on 18 September in Algiers, settles this problem, at least during a trial period; it also includes a number of other provisions which could open new prospects for future French-Algerian cooperation.

The agreement on Algerian workers now in France is the first such agreement in the world. It is based entirely on voluntary action. "It is a balanced agreement," Mr Stoleru, secretary of state to the minister of Labor and one of the negotiators, stated. Algeria has agreed to /the return of workers/ residing in France, and France has agreed that this return should be /based on voluntary action./"

The provisions intended to encourage the return of immigrants have been agreed on by the two governments. Algerian families desirous to return to Algeria, besides being reimbursed for the travelling expenses of the worker and his family, would have to chose between financial assistance in an amount equal to four months' average net salary, a training period either in a factory in Algeria, or in Algerian or French training centers, or again a loan guaranteed by both governments, to be used for the creation of a small-scale enterprise. Algerian workers returning to Algeria shall retain the benefit of the rights they have acquired while in France.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

France will be responsible for the professional training of workers, the salaries of French instructors sent to Algeria under this agreement, and the development of the programs. It will also grant loans for the creation of new professional training centers, and will help in creating small and medium-scale enterprises in Algeria.

The duration of this agreement shall be three years and three months, from October 1980 to December 1983. During this period, the residence permits and working permits of Algerian workers now in France will be automatically extended for 10 years in the case of Algerians who were in France prior to 1962, and for the duration of the agreement in the case of the others.

There are now between 350,000 and 400,000 Algerian workers in France. The objective of the French government is the voluntary return of 35,000 workers plus their families, each year.

The cost of the operation has been estimated at 700 million French francs. It shall be divided between Algeria and France.

At the end of the three years and three months' period, the two governments shall reassess the state of Algerian emigration to France and, if necessary, shall start new negotiations to draw conclusions from it.

The agreement has taken the form of an exchange of letters having diplomatic value. These provide that, before 31 March 1981, an agreement will be signed concerning Arab-language education for Algerian children now in French primary and secondary schools.

Regarding /social security/, a new agreement shall be signed before 30 September 1980. The schedule for family allowances shall be brought to a higher level. The monthly allowance paid to the children living in Algeria, of immigrant workers now in France, would be increased from 40 Algerian dinars (approximately 44 French francs) to 75 dinars (approximately 82 French francs). The two social security systems, Algerian and French, will pay the amounts due by either one.

Regarding /the situation of individuals/, the consular convention which has already been signed shall be applied, and legal cooperation shall be established, particularly with respect to the enforcement of court decisions, especially those concerning the children of mixed couples who are separated or divorced.

The children of harkis [Algerian soldiers who fought on the French side during the Algerian war of independence] shall have the right of free circulation between France and Algeria. As for the sons of harkis who have now reached the age of military or national service, and who usually have a double nationality, their case will be settled at the time of the negotiations on nationality problems which the Algerians and the French have agreed to start next October.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Regarding financial matters in dispute, French authorities expect to increase in the future the pensions paid by France to Algerian citizens residing in Algeria.

For their part, Algerian authorities have announced that decisions would be made to ensure /the transfer of assets of French people/ who have left, or intend to leave Algeria. The French minister of Foreign Affairs underlined that Algerian authorities had made "formal commitments" concerning consular protection and the protection of real estate belonging to French residents in Algeria. Concerning real estate, it is expected that this would involve essentially a modification of the regulations concerning these assets, and especially the removal of the concept of "vacant real estate" which enabled the Algerian state to confiscate any piece of real estate left vacant by a foreigner for more than three consecutive months. The new provisions should allow these assets to be sold by their French owners and the sales price to be transferred to France.

The head of the French diplomacy stated in Algiers that the agreement which has just been signed shall provide "a basis" for, and "a new impetus" to French-Algerian relations. Of course, France and Algeria "do not claim to agree on everything." "Both of us accept the fact that the other is truly different, and we will not reproach him for that, since it is precisely this difference which may be a source of riches in our exchanges and in our dialogue," he underlined.

Fifteen months of difficult negotiations have thus created the conditions required for a new start in French-Algerian relations.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980

#### French-Algerian Precedent

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 pp 38,39

[Article by Abdelaziz Barouhi: "The French-Algerian Precedent"; passages included between slantlines in italics]

[Text] /"A page has now been turned in the relations between our two countries."/ The head of French diplomacy, Jean Francois-Poncet, who was received by President Chadli Bendjedid in Algiers on 18 September, did not conceal his satisfaction. He and Mohamed Benyahia, Algerian minister of Foreign Affairs, whose guest he was, have managed to put down in writing the beginning of a solution to the future of Algerian workers now in France.

After the question of Western Sahara had been put out of the way, after oil and gas had been discussed by the companies, these workers still represented a serious stumbling-block. Since 1978 especially, Algiers could not accept the consequences of the Stoleru-Boulin and Stoleru-Bonnet laws which pushed for the return, even the expulsion of foreigners. In

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

January 1980, an agreement was reached concerning the search for "a concerted solution"--the French unilateral provisions were thus suspended. However, it took Jean Francois-Poncet's visit to Algiers to reach a more complete and coherent agreement. This agreement deals; in particular, with the renewal of residence permits and provides that return should be "voluntary" (see box).

#### Reluctance

Both sides are pleased. The Algerian government in the first place. It can tell its citizens: /"Return is voluntary. There is no obligation."/ The greatest merit of the Algiers agreement, in fact, is that it puts an end to the uncertainty which has been hanging over the Algerian community in France during the past two years. Still, not everybody rejoices at the prospect of returning. /"How do I know that I shall find a job there?"/, Kasdi R., whom we met in the Goutte d'Or district, told us. The habit of living in a consumer society also accounts for this reluctance. Therefore, it is not a mere chance if, during the past 3 years, only 2,500 Algerians (out of a total of 820,000) have applied to return, 2,000 of whom having been prompted to do so by the well-known "million" (of centimes) offered by Stoleru.

It is also not without some anxiety that Algiers contemplate a massive return of these workers, most of whom have had some experience of union struggles while in France. All the more so, as it is not yet clear how they could be reinserted. Even if one states positively that the Five Year Plan will make it possible to absorb 80,000 "homecomers" starting in 1981, especially in the construction trade.

In Paris too, one is pleased. The government, desirous to improve trade relations with Algeria, wishes to reassure French public opinion concerning employment (1.5 million unemployed). It can state: /"We have reached an agreement organizing the return of the immigrants."/

Nevertheless, one wonders how the clause concerning the encouragements to return will be applied. The allowances do not exceed four months' salary. That is meagre. Training? An original idea, but "who says that it will not be second-rate, as in the case of the 325 Algerian trainees who, last June, were supposed to become qualified Diesel mechanics. In fact, they were trained as under-mechanics," young Ahmad B., a Renault worker, remarks.

#### A Model

The secretary of state for Immigrant Workers, Lionel Stoleru, specified the objective aimed at: 35,000 returns each year, thanks to the encouragement measures which would cost some 700 million francs. In Algiers, the press made no mention of this statement. The agreement, in fact, does not specify any quota. However, it is true that Paris has given Algiers

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

a letter informing them of this objective. "The Algerians said neither that it was stupid, nor that it was remarkable," one remarks at the Quai d'Orsay, where one prefers to stress that this is a model agreement.

In fact, this is the first agreement to have been signed between a country of origin and a host country to organize the return of immigrants. Until now, unilateral measures had been used in most cases: the FRG and Switzerland simply sent back some of their immigrants. Not very daring but, in spite of its incompleteness, more in compliance with the recommendations of the International Labor Organization, the Algiers agreement may start a new trend. At any rate for other Africans, Tunisians and Moroccans especially: /"Why not, if some countries ask us to negotiate, taking this agreement as a model?"/, they say in Paris.

#### The New Provisions

/Algerian residents who had arrived prior to August 1962/ (approximately 280,000):

- Automatic renewal of residence (and, therefore, working) permit for 10 years.

/Algerian residents who arrived after August 1962/ (approximately 400,000):

- Automatic renewal of residence (and, therefore, working) permit until December 1983 ("probative period" of three years and three months).

- French provisions to encourage return during this period:

- return-allowance equal to four months' salary, or

- professional training, in France or in Algeria, for 2 to 8 months, depending on the specialty (financing of some 10 centers in Algeria), or

- for craftsmen and merchants: loans enabling them to start a small business in their country (via the Algiers government)

- Algerian provisions to encourage return:

- tax and customs benefits to those who come back;

- access to housing (the construction program shall benefit from an associated assistance from the French government).

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

9294

CSO:4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

EX-EMPRESS RECOUNTS FALL OF MONARCHY

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 15 Aug 80 pp 35-37

[Interview by Jose-Luis de Villalonga with the ex-empress of Iran: "'Yes, I Considered Suicide'"]

[Text] This is the last interview granted by the empress. Several days before the shah's death the writer Jose-Luis de Villalonga had met with Empress Farah in the park of Kube Palace in Cairo. Today the statements and sincere confidences of the empress assume a staggering meaning.

[Question] Have you ever contemplated suicide?

Without even stopping to consider the question she answered:

"Yes."

She took a few steps, slowly, seeking the relative cool of the heavy branches of a giant magnolia tree. She stopped and, still without looking at me, she said quietly, as though talking to herself:

"Yes, I thought about it. But in the abstract, you understand? And never at length. I thought about it on several occasions, in a different state of mind, perhaps close to madness, triggered by physical fatigue, emotional stress, anguish and, sometimes, why deny it, terror. However, I knew that I had no right to disappear, to leave the stage on my own free will. It would have been too easy. I owed this to my people, to my friends, and even to people whom I did not know but who believed in me. In the final account, I am a positive person. This is not the same as being an optimist. It is more serious, more important. I always tell myself that even if matters seem to be going from bad to worse, everything will turn out alright. And even if I have around me people to help me, I have never missed them, for in the final account, one is always alone in solving one's difficulties. This is like diving into the sea. Reaching bottom, one must kick to go up. However, one must do the kicking with one's own foot, not with someone else's.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"I frequently tell myself that in life one must count on oneself only. If you are relying on the strength and courage of others you are nothing. Worse, you are worthless, you do not exist. Since things were really going very badly I was thinking of the people who had always led normal lives and kept telling myself that life had spoiled me beyond any measure and that, in a way, I was paying for this at a stiff rate of interest. If I may say so. There were so many happy and marvelous times, and so much luck. I also kept telling myself that, after all, what was happening to me was perhaps not the worst. I could have been killed, as so many others, yet I was still alive. I had lost neither my husband nor my children. This is a royal gift on which, believe me, I have not always relied. I think, therefore, that one must not be... 'ungrateful' to life. It is because of all this that I could not have killed myself, and also because I cannot stand that someone could say about me, 'poor woman, she could not stand it...she cracked up!' You see, I would never tolerate this!"

The small room furnished in fake Louis XV was in semidarkness. An old dark-skinned butler brought a tray with mint tea and refreshments.

"Thinking seriously about it," said Farah Pahlavi, as though our conversation had not been interrupted, "I believe that when people kill themselves they are in a state very close to that of madness. I, however, am a very well-balanced person."

She seemed suddenly astonished by what she had just said, for, with some confusion, she added:

"Or else, at least, I was."

I started saying she still was but she interrupted me with a gesture:

"I am convinced that one loses a great deal of one's balance when one is forced suddenly to abandon one's natural environment. Anyone forced to leave their country, city, or customs suddenly find themselves without a balance. In exile I asked myself questions which had never concerned me before. Who am I? What is my purpose? I do not know. I am like an element not belonging to anything. Once I had such a great deal to do. Now I have nothing. I try to find around me something worthwhile latching onto but cannot. I have not as yet found what could replace that which I had in the past. Yes, I know that I could invent for myself a number of concerns to let time flow not too painfully, to survive... But this would always be a kind of self-deception. I then told myself that one should be patient and not think about it too much, that one should make plans for the future without taking them too seriously, as though it were a game. You know, we are no longer ourselves at all. Despite us, perhaps, we have changed tremendously..."

She hesitated a fraction of a second and said:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"In the past I would have never talked to someone as I am doing today with you. Believe me, it would have helped me a great deal to be able to talk the way we are doing now, so freely. At our level, however, it was virtually impossible to tell everything to someone. We always had to hold back. It was very frustrating to be unable to tell someone, here, now I really feel like killing myself."

Exiles Help Each Other A Great Deal

She laughed briefly and bitterly.

"Now I no longer feel like committing suicide. You know, exiles help one another a great deal. We telephone and write to one another or see one another when we are in the same city. We try to pretend that we have not been mortally wounded, that we are still standing. Actually, this entire comedy is useless. We have been inflicted wounds which will never heal. In New York, seeing in the street, in front of the hospital, Iranians who were praying for the death of the shah, I felt a terrible shock. I was overwhelmed by a tremendous feeling of fatigue, by a weariness to which I surrendered body and soul. I felt indifferent to everything, good or bad. A friend took me to see her physician. I described to him extensively the circumstances I found myself in, the exile, the illness of the emperor, my friends murdered every day, the permanent danger in which my children lived, the ignorance concerning our immediate future, etc. He listened to me very carefully and then with great sympathy said: 'Don't worry, you have a mild depression.' I was aghast. I had just described to this man a terrifying adventure and he was telling me, with a good-natured smile, that I was suffering from a mild depression and that I should not worry! This annoyed me! You do not know how this annoyed me! Other physicians have recommended to me, not without a reason, to do a great deal of exercise, to 'exhaust myself.' Actually, this was the best means for getting a decent night's sleep. Sometimes, sleep is the only possibility left to us to escape our problems without losing our dignity. Then I plunged into sports. I have never played more tennis than since I left Iran. In San Antonio, in Texas, I practiced every morning at the military base where we were more or less interned. This was more effective than all tranquilizers. But, you see, nevertheless I reached the conclusion that the solution to our problems may be found exclusively within ourselves and, above all, in the acceptance of our fate. This is not fatalism but simply that I believe in the existence of a big book in which our life is written without our knowledge. In other words, we are in the hands of God."

"Madam, are you a believer?"

"Yes, I am. Fortunately, for it is not good to feel alone when one must face the type of problems such as mine."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Do you frequently think of death?"

"No, death is the last thing I think about."

"Yet, you live under the permanent threat of death."

"This is true and we are perfectly aware of it, both the shah and I and the children. However, we never think about it. I believe that it was your King Alphonse XIII who said, when the danger of a possible attempt on his life would be pointed out to him: 'These are the risks of the job.' Well, our risks involve living like reprieved people on death row."

"Did the police disperse the Iranians in New York who spent an entire day and part of the night to pray for the death of the shah?"

"No. The police limited themselves to looking at the demonstrators from afar. They never intervened."

"Curious."

"Yes, curious. Yet, when the Iranians returned the next morning with the intention to resume their prayers, public opinion reacted. When they learned the reason for these prayers, construction workers who were working very close to the hospital let it be known that 'if these savages would show up again they, the workers, would beat them up'."

"Were you not being haunted by an attempt on your lives?"

"To kill the shah? I knew that if someone were to kill him it would be done very professionally, without loose ends, perhaps even making it look like an accident, who knows? The people who resort to this kind of solutions are not burdened by scruples. Furthermore, naturally, they would be working for their country. This calms a lot of scruples, does it not?"

"Luckily, they did not do it."

"Perhaps because we did not give them time enough."

"Or the opportunity."

"Oh, you know, opportunities come by the dozen! The shah is very fatalistic. As far as his security is concerned, he has certainly not been very cautious."

The old butler appeared with refreshments.

"Contadora Island in Panama," Farah Pahlavi said, "is the only place in the course of our exile where I truly had the feeling that an attempt on

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the shah's life could have taken place at any time. On several occasions I found myself thinking of the way this could take place. Would they kill him while he was alone? Or else would they do it in front of me and the children? Or else again would they liquidate all of us together?"

Suddenly she became very pale and her lips began to tremble slightly.

"I am very sorry to have made you think about those times."

"There were times when I could not talk about it. It made me physically ill."

"Madam, to what extent are you aware of the fact that the shah might have received poor advice?"

She first answered with a gesture hard to describe. There was controlled fury and exasperation in her eyes, in the way she moved her hands, in the way she leaned forward. She burst out:

"The shah not only received bad advice but he was tricked, abused, misled. He was trifled with at the expense of his life. Yes, promises were made to him which were never kept. He was implacably pushed to his fall. He was... he was... "

Yes, Everything Developed Too Suddenly...

She vainly sought the proper words. I intervened:

"The clear and blunt French expression is, he was made a fool of."

She looked at me for a while, amazed. Farah Pahlavi has lost the habit of listening to this kind of conversation. She laughed shortly and admitted:

"No better way to say this. Listen, let me explain..." She lit up another cigarette. She was no longer glancing at her wristwatch. She spoke with passion.

"Very simple. From 1978 to 1979 they pushed the shah toward..."

"They? Who, madam?"

"The British and the Americans but, above all, the Americans. They pushed the king toward extensively liberalizing the system. Such liberalization had long been considered by his majesty. However, this change of Iranian policy had to take place gradually, very cautiously, with a lot of time. The entire country was in a state of ferment, in a state of convulsive outbreaks which burst all over the place, under the slightest pretext. It



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

was truly not the time for releasing some ballast. Meanwhile, however, the American ambassador, as well as the British ambassador, kept telling the shah whenever they met: 'Hold on, Your Majesty, you have our support!'"

"Do I understand properly that the allied and friendly ambassadors were advising the shah to take a stand contrary to the one held by their own governments?"

"Precisely. In public and in front of world public opinion, the advice to the shah was one of moderation. Confidentially, however, the White House had let him know that the American government would not be displeased by seeing a strong military repression which would put an end to the chaos which reigned in the country, threatening petroleum supplies to the Western world. This is so that you could understand the attitude which prevailed among the leaders of our main ally! On the street level things were already different. Starting with 1978 we could feel the grumbling discontent not only in the factories but also among those known in Europe as the 'white collar workers'."

"What were the main reasons for this discontent, for this indifference?"

She threw into the ashtray her crumbled empty cigarette package and opened another one. She was smoking rather ordinary Egyptian cigarettes.

"Well," she answered after a brief pause, "I believe that everything developed too quickly, far too quickly the moment his majesty launched his white revolution."

She smiled again and, as though apologizing, said:

"The entire country suddenly plunged into abundance. Forgive me for saying something which might seem to you an enormous exaggeration but that was the case. Huge fortunes were made in a few months by people who would have never dreamed of becoming so wealthy. I must admit that discretion was not their strongest feature. For the others, the small people, workers and peasants, things began to change too rapidly as well. They felt their customs, their traditions shaken up. You ask me what were the major problems we faced. Well, they are endless. I think, however, that we should give priority to the problem of housing and, naturally, of inflation. Housing problems were felt above all in Tehran. A bird's-eye view would reveal that Tehran is an exceptionally widespread city. Iranians do not like to live 'vertically,' in towers as in Europe or in skyscrapers as in the United States. When people from all the cities and villages of Iran rushed on Tehran, attracted by well-paid work and the possibility to become rich very quickly, construction had to be launched very quickly. This led to stupid problems such as, for example, the lack of cement. There was a shortage of cement because our roads and, above all, our ports were blocked by merchandise coming from everywhere. Sometimes ships would remain docked for months before they could be unloaded. No one had

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

predicted this rush, this abundance. Thousands of trucks were lined up at the Turkish border, loaded with this precious cement which we lacked as well as with goods which the rich alone could buy, thus widening more and more the gap between social classes and reviving hatreds and jealousies."

Farah Pahlavi stopped. Suddenly she seemed to be very far away. She lowered her head and gently massaged her temples. Then she whispered:

"Yes, everything was too quick..."

She raised her head and added:

"You know, this was a mad race against the clock."

I already knew the answer to the question I was about to ask her:

"Why the rush?"

She took an aside:

"Starting with 1974 the king knew of his illness. He wanted to structure the country in depth to be able to leave to his son a firm and stable Iran."

She hesitated briefly before saying:

"The shah has always worked as though he were short of time."

"Is it accurate that there were over 50,000 people working in Iran and abroad for Savak?"

"In his book 'Answer to History,' the shah cites the figure of 4,000. The least that could be said about him is that he was well informed."

"As to political prisoners, I now recall that the opposition used against the shah a clandestine publication entitled 'A Chronicle of Repression' which stated that between 1968 and 1977 people detained for political reasons numbered very precisely 3,164, whereas some French newspapers reported that we were holding 100,000 political prisoners. As the British say, 'no comment'."

Our Enemies Were Very Strong

"No comment," madam. Nevertheless, we must note that some Savak actions greatly tarnished the image of the shah-an-shah in the West."

"I know. This being said, let me remind you, first, that the shah has always, always pardoned those who have made an attempt on his life, starting with Fakr Arai who tried to shoot him with a revolver on the steps of Tehran University. The shah has also always granted a pardon to people

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

sentenced for all sorts of crimes which had nothing to do with state security. On the other hand, it would be proper to remind those who tend to forget it that responsibility for police and intelligence services--of Savak, therefore,--was not in the least that of the shah but of the ministers of defense and interior."

"Were you expecting such an outbreak of hatred in your own country?"

"No. This may have been an error on my part. Frequently hatred is nothing but the result of the skillful manipulation of the masses. In Iran this took place under our very own nose. This was nothing new. Already during the crisis triggered by Dr Mossadegh, the people took to the streets of Tehran shouting 'Death to the shah!' Three days later, that same crowd was shouting 'Long live the shah!' We now know the worth of insults or praises. They are worthless. Everything is a question of knowing how to use a certain type of propaganda more or less skillfully. I must say, our enemies were very strong."

"Did you feel totally abandoned in the course of those terrible weeks which preceded your departure from Iran?"

"No, never. Even during the final hours that we spent on Iranian soil we received the tokens of deep loyalty."

"I have seen photographs of generals kissing the shah's hands, crying."

"Yes, and some of them were executed shortly afterwards because of this gesture."

"In the course of your exile, were those usually known as the powerful in this world extending to you signs of friendship?"

Farah Pahlavi smiled slightly.

"You know, both the great and the small of this world could have a warm heart. However, I believe that President Sadat deserves a special place. 'He is a very great gentleman'."

Speaking of the Egyptian president Farah Pahlavi would use that expression repeatedly, always adding, "I pray for him every evening."

"President Sadat," she explained, "kept close touch with us since the start of the events. Afraid of the turn of events in our country, Mrs Sadat called me frequently, begging me to seek refuge in Egypt. The president never applied pressure on the shah in this respect. His messages were always the same: 'You know where to find me if you need me.' Therefore, as you know, it was to Egypt that we went when we left Iran."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

She dragged deeply on the Gitane I offered her and went on:

"Except for President Sadat, who has always been on our side, the first to offer us the hospitality of this country was the prince of Monaco. To us this was a surprise, for we were not close friends. We had simply met on two or three occasions. This did not prevent him from being the first to tell us, 'Come!' To us his gesture was a great comfort."

"Did any other chief of state offer you asylum after the prince of Monaco?"

"Yes, the president of an eastern European country whom I do not wish to name offered us his hospitality for an indefinite time."

"Why are you unwilling to tell us who?"

With a slight ambiguous smile and a distant tone of voice she answered:

"He is a person who would be horrified by this type of publicity."

I could not help but think of Mr Ceausescu, president of the Romanian People's Republic, whose esteem and friendship for the shah of Iran are public knowledge.

"There also were some chiefs of state who would have definitely led you to the slaughterhouse. I am thinking of..."

"Please, no names. I do not like to accuse anyone of such things. They had their reasons..."

Hold On, Courage

"Petroleum..."

"...They have their reasons which I do not wish to know. The chiefs of state who behaved well toward us were in the majority. The king of Spain, for example, even though his country did not officially offer us asylum for security reasons, sent us a cable offering his help to the extent of his possibilities. The British Court did the same. There were others as well. However, we, ourselves, did not want to create problems to friends. As to the others... one must try to understand the negative reaction of some statesmen toward us. They were forced to follow the line of their governments. However, even those who officially remained silent contacted us as private persons. They telephoned us and wrote us, 'Hold on, have courage.... Let time go by'."

"Did you hear this from Mr Giscard d'Estaing?"

Farah Pahlavi's face assumed a guarded expression. She quietly dropped:

"No comment."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

With a gesture she asked me for another cigarette. Then, with a zestfulness which seemed to me somewhat artificial, she exclaimed:

"But why speak of heads of state only? It was the simple people, strangers, who were truly extraordinary! We received thousands of letters from the world over. 'We are thinking of you in your time of trials.... We are thinking of your children....' Some advised us to have faith. Others shared with us their philosophy. Others again shared their experience. We received postcards clumsily written by children, gifts, insignificant little gifts which, however, warmed our hearts. This was marvelous, you know, truly marvelous!"

Tears appeared in her beautiful eyes, which she wiped off with the back of her hand, furtively.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipress S.A.

5157  
CSO: 4900

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT ISSUES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jul pp 24-26

[Interview With Na'im Haddad, National Assembly Speaker, by Kamal Hasan Bakhit; "Dialogue With Iraqi National Assembly Speaker on Opposition, Elections and Relations With Palestinians; Na'im Haddad: 'We Will Bring to Harsh Account Partisans Shunned by People; Our Relations Are Good With PLO and Fatah and Severed With Popular and Democratic Fronts'"]

[Text] Baghdad--Na'im Haddad is a member of the Ba'th Party National Command, the official in charge of the command's Palestine and Armed Struggle Bureau and one of the officials who ran in the recent general elections and won broad popular support. He is also the man who has been elected unanimously by his colleagues as the National Assembly speaker.

To be able to devote himself to the enormous tasks of his new position and in accordance with the National Council law, the Revolution Command Council has relieved Na'im Haddad from his position as deputy prime minister.

Na'im Haddad is always a leader among those speaking in the name of the Arab national regime in Iraq. He is always careful to make his statements frank, clear and precise.

On the occasion of his election as the National Assembly speaker and the occasion of the start of this pioneer democratic experiment in this Arab country, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has sought to interview Na'im Haddad on the general elections, the National Assembly, the democratic experiment, the Iraqi-Palestinian relations and the Iraqi-Arab relations by virtue of his partisan position.

We said to the National Assembly speaker:

[Question] How do you view the National Assembly's forthcoming task as watchdog over the state agencies?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] The National Assembly law provides for giving the National Assembly a big role in supervision over the state agencies and in summoning ministers to appear before it and to be questioned on the activities of their ministries. The assembly will perform fully the role entrusted to it. It will act as watchdog over the works of the various ministries and will exert efforts to correct the negative aspects. It will then question the ministers and follow up on their abidance by implementation of the five-year plan. The assembly will familiarize itself with the needs of the masses in all parts of the country and will offer the right solutions for the activities of the various ministries. The assembly's role and the role of the popular and partisan control will complement each other so as to reach the peaceful solutions for the various problems encountered by our country.

[Question] What is the National Assembly's relationship with the Revolution Command Council insofar as the legislative task is concerned?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Revolution Command Council is the main legislative and leadership authority in our revolutionary system. The National Assembly represents the legislative authority elected by the people. Constitutionally, the work of the two bodies is complementary. The National Assembly law sets 4 months for its meetings [session]. All the bills will be presented to the assembly during this period and the assembly will be facing heavy tasks in legislating various laws. We will work seriously and fundamentally to bring about changes in the interest of the people's masses.

[Question] How about the assembly's relationship with the self-rule area?

[Answer] The National Assembly is the legislative body for all of Iraq. The Legislative Council is the legislative authority for the self-rule area. The legislations concerning the country as a whole will come under the duties of the National Assembly. The legislations particular to the self-rule area will be the task of the Legislative Council.

[Question] Will the National Assembly establish relations with the Arab and international representative councils and unions?

[Answer] In the National Assembly's first working session which followed the opening session, the question of our assembly's accession to the membership of the International Parliamentary Federation was brought up. After detailed study and discussions on all the facts, the assembly adopted a resolution to join the said federation. Only one member opposed the accession on the grounds of the argument that the Zionist entity is a member of the International Parliamentary Federation.

We will present our application to join the said federation in the near future. We will also establish relations with the various parliaments, people's assemblies and national councils to enhance their understanding of the cause of our Arab struggle and to win them over to our central cause, namely the Palestine issue.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In fact, we now have before us several studies on the nature of the parliaments in various countries of the world. A large number of parliaments have sent us cables congratulating us on the birth of our assembly and asserting their desire to establish firm relations with us.

No Need for Appointment

[Question] In some parliamentary councils, a certain percentage of the members are appointed. Why hasn't this procedure been followed in the Iraqi National Assembly?

[Answer] Democratic elections have been conducted in the country and the issue of having a number of deputies appointed by the president of the republic has been excluded finally. The reason is that our revolutionary system interacts with the people and enjoys the trust and respect of the masses. This is why the party and revolution leadership decided to nominate a number of the Revolution Command Council members to run for direct election by the people. Therefore, there has been no need to resort to appointment. When we nominated ourselves, our people's masses responded to us with high confidence. The masses' magnificent partiality toward us has been obvious.

The weak regimes that do not believe in the masses and that are not confident of the success of their candidates are the ones that resort to these methods to create an equation in an assembly and in its resolutions. Our revolutionary regime lives the life of the masses and enjoys their support because it is from the masses. Therefore, there is no need to depend on appointment. In our evaluation, the result has been brilliant and has underlined the masses' support for our revolution, for their party and for Saddam Hussayn, their triumphant leader.

We have been eager to make the election campaign democratic and free and to give equal opportunities to all. Even in terms of propaganda, we have banned to [Ba'th] partisans their legitimate right to individual propaganda and to the other means used by the candidates of the other parties and by the independent candidates. We have been very strict in preserving and adhering to principles. We brought to harsh account the partisans who swerved from the party's resolution. Some of them have been expelled for conducting themselves in a manner incompatible with the conduct approved by the party and the revolution. We have given the other non-partisan candidates the full opportunity.

We have said that a partisan struggler who does not enjoy the support and trust of the masses must not be in the party. This is why the elections have acted as a touchstone for testing the strugglers' cohesion with the masses. Many of our comrades have failed in several districts. As you know, there were 840 candidates whereas the number of required deputies is 250. The judgement passed by the masses on some of the colleagues who have failed has been a harsh one. Therefore, the relations to those comrades with the masses must be reconsidered.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Other comrades failed because a large number of partisans were nominated in the same district. The masses will elect one candidate by necessity and not because they do not love or respect the other candidates. The reason is due, as I have already said, to the nomination of a large number of partisans in the same district.

So appointment, in my evaluation, is not at all compatible with the principle of democracy, regardless of what justifications such appointment is given. Therefore, our regime, which is confident of its capabilities and of the masses' love for it, waged the election campaign in a unique manner free of all the aspects of falsification to which numerous regimes resort.

[Question] Why didn't all the Revolution Command Council members nominate themselves?

[Answer] This issue was discussed at length. But in view of the fact that the Revolution Command Council in its entirety represents a legislative leadership, the establishment in its entirety could not run in the elections. This is why it was decided to nominate some of the council's members.

[Question] How will the National Assembly work to overcome some of the negative aspects mentioned by President Saddam Husayn in his speech to the assembly's opening session?

[Answer] After the National Assembly elections, the party leadership asked all the candidates, partisan organizations, the government agencies in the various parts of the country and the committees supervising the elections to submit reports diagnosing the negative aspects. The president's visits during the elections were for the purpose of getting acquainted with the negative aspects that may result from the election process. A large number of reports have gathered before the leadership which is studying them carefully to pinpoint the flawed and negative spots in the practices of the party members, the party organizations and the party candidates in order to lay down the right foundations for the next elections.

The elections have been the first exercise [of its kind] for the party. It is an exercise that deserves respect not because it is our experience but because it has been a democratic process that has embodied the will of the masses to elect their representatives. This is what makes us proud of this exercise because, in our evaluation, it is the first experience of its kind in the Arab homeland, especially since it has come in the wake of a number of democratic transformations in the country and of the elimination of the previous centers of power and since it has reaffirmed the masses' respect for the party and for its revolutionary accomplishments.

No Opposition

[Question] Is there opposition inside the assembly? If it does exist, what is its role and within what framework will it move?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] With the Revolution Command Council resolution considering all the candidates as the revolution candidates, the word opposition came to an end because all those who have won in the elections are the sons of the revolution, regardless of their partisan affiliation. All are the sons of the revolution and both the partisans and the non-partisans have the freedom of speech, of democratic dialogue, of discussion and of expression. Each of us in the assembly has his own interpretation within the framework of the revolution. But with faith in the revolution's revolutionary course, opposition ends. However, different interpretations continue to exist and different viewpoints continue to exist. We believe that all the opinions expressed during discussions in the assembly are in the interest of serving the ongoing revolutionary development process and flow into the course of serving the Iraqi people's interest.

Therefore, and in view of the leadership's resolution considering all the candidates who have won or lost in the elections as sons of the revolution, I do not believe that any opposition will emerge. As leader Saddam Husayn has said, we will not permit any opposition outside the canopy of the revolution.

[Question] In your capacity as the speaker of the first representative assembly in Iraq in the past 25 years, what is your evaluation of this phase and what is your personal feeling as the first speaker of this assembly?

[Answer] I do not agree with you when you say 25 years because since the start of the so-called national rulers, Iraq has not witnessed any free and democratic elections. Assemblies [presumably during the monarchy] were appointed and imposed by the tribal and capitalist centers of power. I do not believe that there have been in our Arab homeland any democratic elections giving the Arab people the full freedom to elect whoever they want. In Iraq, parliaments used to be appointed. Elections were held only once and the national forces won five seats. Consequently, the parliament was dissolved immediately.

I say that our party is the first party in the Arab homeland to give the model experiment to the masses of our people in the Arab homeland. I am very happy with the results produced by the elections, not because the party has won an overwhelming majority but because the elections have been conducted with utter democracy. This is why I believe that these elections will become a model adopted by the masses in our Arab homeland generally. The elections are the first application by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party of the principle of popular democracy.

I am certainly very pleased with my election to the position of the first speaker of this assembly which constitutes the first experiment for the persecuted and tormented Arab man in exercising his freedom. This is why I believe that the rays of this experiment will spread to the entire Arab arena and shake the Arab conscience and feelings. I believe that the results which will be produced by this assembly will be the true mirror reflecting

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the nature of our revolutionary regime and truth of our masses' exercise of their full freedom in our country. The results will be big at all levels, will awaken the masses to demand their rights and will expose some of the Arab regimes that have falsified the will of the masses by conducting rigged elections for what they have called people's or national assemblies.

[Question] After taking your new position, will you continue to be the official in charge of the Palestine and Armed Struggle Bureau of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party National Command?

[Answer] (Haddad replied laughingly) There is no conflict between my position in the National Assembly and my partisan responsibilities. Naturally, you have heard of the decision relieving me of my position as deputy prime minister because this position is in conflict with my presence at the head of the National Assembly--a position that requires giving up governmental, but not partisan, positions.

[Question] On the occasion, how do you view Iraq's relations with the PLO?

[Answer] I can describe our present relationship with the PLO as positive and advanced. The truth is that this is not just a word I say but a fact to which every Arab citizen attests. The aid that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party has advanced to the Palestinian revolution is big. Consultation on positions between the PLO and the party is ceaseless. Our bilateral relations with Fatah Organization and with the PLO are also advanced. Our front, the Arab Liberation Front, operates within the framework of the PLO.

#### Relationship With Popular and Democratic [Fronts]

[Question] But Iraq's relations with some Palestinian organizations have turned lukewarm recently?

[Answer] Our party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, has taught us that political action is a matter of ethical commitment primarily. We have always dealt and we continue to deal with every faction, whether inside or outside the Palestinian revolution, with the honorable word and with faith in the cause. This is why we have been very tolerant and why we have advanced big aid to the various liberation forces.

Our relationship with the Democratic Front--and I would like to stress that I am the first partisan comrade to talk about this disagreement--was shaken when this front started to consider the settlement. It was the first front to try to weaken the Arab steadfastness, to introduce the element of the international balances into the Arab arena and to torpedo the armed struggle which, we have always believed and continue to believe, constitutes the only path toward the liberation of Palestine.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We have advised this front but it has persisted on this defeatist path. Therefore, we have had no recourse but to sever the relations with it and to stop all aid to it because we should not advance aid to any wavering Palestinian element. Despite this, we have kept the front's offices in Baghdad open even though our relations with the front are severed.

This front has not desisted recently but has persisted in its hostility toward the cause and the revolution in Iraq and it began to lead all the waves of hostility toward the revolution and the party. It used to embrace the Iraqi communists and attack the [Ba'th] party secretly. Meanwhile, whenever I met with Nayif Hawatimah, the front chairman, he used to assure me that he is against the Soviet Union's positions, that he considers the Iraqi communists fascist elements and that he saw their atrocities in Iraq in 1959. He used to stress the importance of our alliance and say that the Democratic Front is closer to the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party than to the Iraqi communists or the Soviet Union. But upon leaving Baghdad, he would turn the opposite way and take positions conflicting with what he used to tell me. This front does not possess the elements of ethics generally and of Arab ethics in particular.

[Question] How about the Popular Front?

[Answer] As for the Popular Front, our relationship with it was positive and we used to cooperate through the Arab Rejectionist Front. Iraq used to advance all kinds of aid to this front by virtue of its being opposed to the settlement. The situation continued to be good but then, in my opinion, this front began to experience special internal circumstances and the issue of the Palestinian state began to be projected by this front's Political Bureau. This front then embarked on its opportunistic and mercenary relations, especially after it established a relationship of material interest with the Libyan regime. Some of the front's members also began to get involved with some international forces. To collect the price, and this is a fact that I have to say, the front had to become hostile to the party and the revolution in Iraq to prove that it is not, contrary to what is said, a part of the Rejectionist Front and that it is ready to give and take.

This front then started, in its turn, to embrace the Iraqi communists and to defend their positions.

When we inspected its office, we found in them large quantities of weapons, grenades and explosives. Therefore, this office had to be closed so that the Arab masses may know these impostors.

This is the complete story of our disagreement with the Democratic Front and the Popular Front.

[Question] There are whispers that the Soviet Union is behind the position of the Popular and Democratic Fronts toward Iraq.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] The Soviet Union is not Palestine. We are friends with the Soviet Union. But we have always disagreed with the Soviet Union because of its position toward the Palestinian issue and we have always conducted dialogue with the Soviet Union because it is a friend. We are Arabs and the cause is our cause and not the Soviet Union's cause.

The Soviet Union cannot impose its opinion and strategy on any man unless he is ready to accept this opinion or that strategy. Those who have accepted this policy are not nationalists. The heroic Palestinian people are the ones fighting the Zionist occupation with stones and making enormous sacrifices and not those who live on the tables of others and loiter in their hotels.

#### Dialogue Is Solution

[Question] Let me turn to the Lebanese problem. What, in your opinion, is the decisive solution for this problem?

[Answer] It is nothing new to say that the Lebanese problem or the Lebanese arena is an arena of Lebanese struggle. It is also nothing new to say that armed conflict is a difficult and complicated path that leads to no solution. Leader President Saddam Husayn said this long ago to the late Kamal Junblatt and to the National Movement before matters were exploded in this manner in Lebanon.

President Husayn said that the path toward solving the Lebanese crisis lies in the democratic dialogue that leads to detente. We have also said that there is no winner and no loser in this war and that all are losers.

The Lebanese people are . . . loser and the Arab nation is, ultimately, the loser. It is being reaffirmed now that the path of dialogue, detente and coexistence is the only right path leading to a solution to the Lebanese crisis.

[Question] How do you evaluate Iraq's relationship with the Lebanese National Movement?

[Answer] Our relationship with the Lebanese National Movement is a strategic relationship. We support the majority in this movement and we have advanced relations with most of the movement's factions, be they the Lebanese Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Socialist Progressive Party or the other sides of the Lebanese National Movement. Our relationship is strategic because we meet on a path that leads to the same goals.

#### Aden Regime Antagonizes Us

[Question] How about Iraq's relations with South Yemen, especially in the wake of the latest change in Aden?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] The regime in South Yemen is a fascist regime that persecutes the masses of our people in Yemen, including the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party strugglers who are incarcerated in jails.

We always supported and backed this regime and advanced enormous aid to it with the aim of enabling it to stand fast in the face of the imperialist plots in the Arab Gulf area. We always dealt with this regime with high ethics. But this regime did not reciprocate and always failed to live up to what it said. This was during the presidency of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.

After the overthrow of Isma'il, President Saddam Husayn cabled 'Ali Nasir Muhammad with the aim of establishing good relations. But this regime has persisted in its course of hostility toward our revolutionary regime. When this regime corrects its positions, we are ready to establish normal relations on clear ethical bases.

[Question] There is another question concerning another dimension on the Arab arena. How do you view the situation in Eritrea? What is your position toward the Italian Communist Party's mediation for the establishment of self-rule in Eritrea through cooperation with one of the Eritrean factions and with the aid of the international forces?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the fascist Ethiopian regime, like the preceding imperialist regime of Haile Selassie, resorts to war and the murder of our people in Eritrea while maneuvering through its projection of the idea of self-rule.

Our people in Eritrea understand the dimensions of this regime's scheme. They have offered thousands of martyrs and they are still carrying on with the struggle for liberation.

We support the Eritrean revolution to achieve the Eritrean people's goals. Numerous international forces have taken part in this dirty war--the war for annihilating the Eritrean people. But the good forces are still helping and supporting the Eritrean revolution to achieve its goals.

As for our position toward the Communist Party's mediation, we support what the Eritrean people choose because they are the people concerned with their own issue.

Here I must point out that the tricks of international politics are numerous and that there are those who seek power in the revolution. The interests of some factions may meet with foreign interests but the Eritrean people are, as I have already said, steadfast people who will march forth on the path of their independence. These people have exposed the international game and have opposed it in their entirety. I do not believe that this issue [mediation] will succeed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] Finally, what is your evaluation of the Iraqi-French relations?

[Answer] The fact is that our relations with France are normal and advanced, especially in the economic sphere. Naturally, we seek to develop these relations with France and with the European countries to enable Europe to break away from the U.S. domination.

We believe that there are broad spheres to develop these relations and to achieve their goals in full.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

8494

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

BRIEFS

YACHT PURCHASE--The naval shipyard of Elsinore [Helsingor] has received an order from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for a yacht worth 100 million kroner. To be delivered in 1982, this boat will be designed for official receptions on the Tigris. Danish shipyards have already shipped a liner to Iraq, several months ago. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Sep 80 p 30] 11466

CSO: 4800

7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

PHALANGE VICTORY OVER NLP, PLANS FOR PARTITION ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jul 80 pp 27, 28-29, 30-32

[Article: "Honor Thy Father in the 'Lebanese Front'"]

[Text] The Family Dispenses With the Godfather

Bashir al-Jumayyil (age 29) emerged from his bloody confrontation last week shrewd Maronite politician Camille Sham'un (age 80) as the greatest Lebanese Christian military leader and politician, although he actually controls only 1,500 square kilometers of the total Lebanese acreage of tens of thousands of square kilometers.

While the Lebanese await Sham'un's decision to remain in al-Jumayyil's ghetto or withdraw from it, concern prevails on the official and popular levels over the likelihood that Jumayyil will announce the establishment of a Christian separatist state, with the support of his regular militia, which includes about 20,000 fighters. His aim would be to unify the Maronite ghetto and remove 600,000 Palestinians from Lebanon. He also relies, it is rumored, on military and moral support from Israel.

Political pressure has increased on President Ilyas Sarkis (age 54) to move quickly to deploy his army of 22,000 soldiers in the Christian ghetto to prevent the Phalange Party from announcing its separatist step.

However, President Sarkis prefers to wait, and stipulates that the Liberal and Phalange Parties approve of such development first. Sham'un has agreed to official army intervention, while Bashir al-Jumayyil expressed absolute opposition.

It now seems that the ultimate loser in the bloody confrontation is Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil (age 75), father of Shaykh Bashir and leader of the Phalange, who lost his direct control over his regular party militia. There is also another loser, Shaykh Amin (age 33), Bashir's elder brother, who uses al-Jabal [central Lebanese mountain area] as a base for his political and military activities.

Sham'un recognized the complete destruction of the military machinery of his party. Nevertheless, he has thus far refused to accept honorary leadership of the Phalange in exchange for dissolving his party. However,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

it is not yet clear whether he will retire from political work entirely, remain as a symbolic leader of the Maronite sect under Phalangist supremacy, or move to the western Muslim region, where he would live in his village of Dayr al-Qamar, which is surrounded by a Druze majority in the mountainous al-Shuf, which extends to the southeast of Beirut.

Syria, which is keeping about 20,000 soldiers in Lebanon, has not made any move suggesting that it will suppress the absolute authority of the Phalange over the Christian ghetto in eastern Beirut, some of the mountainous areas and the coastal regions, following the elimination of the Liberal Party.

Most observers in Beirut are coming to the conclusion that Damascus is gloating over what happened to Sham'un, who was a strong opponent of its military presence in Lebanon. This conclusion is based on the recent rapprochement between Damascus and the Phalange, at a time when the Syrian Deterrent Forces do not want to get involved in a military confrontation in Lebanon, while the regime in Syria is suffering from difficulties in facing armed religious violence, which is increasing in gravity and spreading. It is also said that Damascus considers it in its interest to have the Phalange and Liberal parties, who opposed its authority over the Christian area, fight one another so fiercely.

As for the Palestinians, they have had more than one contact with Sham'un in past months. It is said that they would welcome his move to the western region [of Beirut] of Dayr al-Qamar. The Socialist Progressive Party is cautious about such a move. It does not want to see Sham'un, an expert in stirring up political and sectarian feelings, return to the party stronghold in al-Shuf.

Dani Sham'un (age 40), commander of the National Liberal Party [NLP] militia and President Sham'un's son, had expressed his willingness to move to western Beirut of Dayr al-Qamar. He actually met with Yasir 'Arafat immediately after the bloody battle.

This is a summary of the developments of the political situation following the Maronite-Maronite war in the eastern ghetto. It is a situation which is comparable to a theater of the absurd, more than anything else. The following are reports filed by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondents in Beirut about the fighting and its political results.

#### Seven Hundred Killed in the Settling of Accounts Between the Phalange and the NLP

At first, the victor and the vanquished agreed that losses ranged from 50 to 100 killed. Then Dani Sham'un revised the estimate of losses to 530 killed. However, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's information is that losses amounted to 700 killed in one massacre unparalleled in the Lebanese war for the past 5 years.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The council of ministers, which met on Wednesday, 9 July, put its finger on the issue which the clashes of the Phalange and the NLP in the eastern regions of Beirut have revived and aggravated more than ever before.

President Ilyas Sarkis, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss, and the ministers who sat around the conference table at the Presidential Palace each came to pose one question: And now, what next? What will happen now that the Phalangist Party has been able to impose its authority over the eastern regions [of Beirut], placing the NLP under its wing? What will happen to Lebanon?

Each official would move to talk, only to change his mind at the last moment. However, President Sarkis came close to stating the bitter truth when he told the members of the outgoing government that the state is not responsible for what has happened, or what is expected to happen, because it cannot deploy the army in the inflamed areas, except by mutual consent of all parties. This is so, because the legitimate army is a new army which is still being developed. It has gone through only 3 years of a phase of difficult growth. Due to that, peace depends on the armed militias, which have obstructed and are still obstructing the mission of the state, and are acting as if their only concern is to remain effective and influential on the domestic scene.

Prime Minister al-Huss came closer than President Sarkis to answer the question [of what next?], when he said that as of this week, Lebanon stands at major and fateful crossroads, and that as a result of deliberate armed actions, the existence of Lebanon has become subject to collapse and fragmentation under the influence of any decision taken by any of the armed extremist organizations.

What President al-Huss did not spell out at the meeting, he expressed afterwards to some of his close friends. What he said was: What is to prevent some parties, or, to be exact, the Phalangist Party in particular, from proclaiming autonomy of the areas controlled by the Phalangist militia? What force will stop such a step? What would deter armed men not to make such a dangerous decision as this?

Information Available to Sarkis and al-Huss

Appearing to base their information on statements made by Prime Minister al-Huss, these friends of al-Huss say that President Sarkis has firm information that the Phalangist leadership decided several weeks ago to impose the authority of one party over the eastern regions and to oust all non-Phalangist armed organizations from these regions. This Phalangist resolution called for subduing both the armed and political organization of the NLP, which is headed by Camille Sham'un.

These sources also say that when this information reached the government, it discussed it at several closed meetings with security commanders. The

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

matter was discussed more seriously at meetings held to deal with the clashes between the NLP and Phalange in Wadi Shahrur and Kafr Shima in the southeastern suburbs of Beirut.

Several proposals were submitted, including deploying the army in force; declaring a state of emergency; or putting together a strike force consisting of the army, the internal security forces and the Arab Deterrent Forces to intervene at any time to suppress any party move to threaten Lebanon.

However, all of this came to an end, because the president was not convinced that the army could play this role, and believed that the Arab Deterrent Forces could not assume this function either.

Dani Sham'un, son of President Camille Sham'un, learned these facts and all of their details when he visited the Presidential Palace to talk with President Sarkis on how to meet the coming danger. The detailed accounts which were given to him proved that he is not (involved in?) media clamor which accompanies the operation of building the army, especially that stirred up by the American government every time it sends a crate of ammunition to the port for the Lebanese army. This army possesses only light and intermediate weapons and some old tanks which remained in army barracks when the army collapsed in 1972. In the meantime, the militias have advanced weapons with which to strike the army at any time. This imbalance cannot be compensated for, unless the army resorts to using the air force. This is out of the question, since air strikes against militia area cannot be contemplated.

#### Sham'un Resorts to Mutual Agreement and Understanding

In the face of this gloomy picture, which Dani Sham'un subsequently conveyed to his father, Camille Sham'un resorted to normal methods of communication with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. According to reports, Sham'un pressed al-Jumayyil to set a date for a closed Lebanese Front meeting to adopt basic resolutions to prevent renewed clashes.

President Sham'un received information that a large army of foreign mercenaries working in the eastern region [of Beirut] had begun to move toward the mountain positions of the NLP, and that there were Phalangist military concentrations in the areas of Kasrwan, northern Matn and al-Ashrafiyah. These were acting in a way suggesting intent to carry out a widescale military operation.

According to information from Sham'un's circles, he felt that the whole thing was a routine military movement which took its unusual appearance to avoid clashes with organizations in the western region [of Beirut], or with the Arab Deterrent Forces, due to the imminent discussion by the Arab League of the expansion of these forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

However, the calculations of President Camille Sham'un and his son Dani this time fit neither the situation nor the calculations of the Phalangists. Dani Sham'un, whose protection in al-Hazimiyah was taken over by the state and the army after Amin al-Jumayyil [protectively] removed him from Fiqran in a military patrol boat before Phalangist fighters arrived to kill him and his companions, said:

"Everything happened suddenly. The Phalangists and the mercenaries destroyed our homes, our offices, the homes of the security guards, and the hotels and chalets. They killed and destroyed. They tried to exterminate my family, my brother Dory's son, my son and me, if they could. Then they completely destroyed the area and imposed a one party rule, discarding all of the agreements which we concluded with them, and which we renewed at every meeting."

#### Seven Hundred Killed

New official information reveals details which Dani Sham'un did not mention. It says that Pierre al-Jumayyil rescued Camille Sham'un at the last minute from death at the hands of the Phalangists and mercenaries who surrounded his home in al-Ashrafiyah, and that Pierre al-Jumayyil is the one who saved Dory Sham'un's sons from death after they were kidnapped for several hours.

As for Dani Sham'un's family, they miraculously escaped death. Only his daughter was injured, because the killers who burst into his home in Safra looking for him, were surprised by his absence, and had to be content with setting it on fire. They moved his wife, daughter and mother-in-law to several Phalangist positions, before they were rescued by Pierre al-Jumayyil.

At first, everyone concealed the true number of victims, originally estimated at between 50 and 100 killed. Confirmed information in a number of secret official reports revealed last Wednesday that the total of NLP and Phalangist dead reached 700, in addition to the wounded, and the destruction which befell the attacked villages and party positions.

The story reached the ears of President Sham'un, when he heard Bashir al-Jumayyil say at the meeting held by the two parties after the destructive war: "What do you want us to do? The young men were hotheaded (he meant the Phalangist fighters), and wanted to take vengeance for the Phalangists who were shot by the NLP in (Kafr Shima) and Wadi Shahrur. I cannot control the reaction of every fighter, especially if his comrade or brother or relative had been killed."

Camille Sham'un rejected this justification, and said that the complete attack to which the offices of the NLP, the homes of its members and the firms owned by some of them were subjected, in addition to attacks on the homes of security force members, offer clear proof that the matter goes beyond the limits of spontaneous reaction. Also, it exceeds any desire to avenge a brother, relative or friend.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sham'un added that as long as he sees things in this light, it means that it was a planned and studied move, and that the fight will be repeated. Therefore, he will ask all NLP fighters to leave their positions and withdraw to their homes, because he does not want the eastern regions to turn into a stage for a Maronite massacre.

Camille Sham'un actually carried out his decision, relying to a great extent on the intervention of Maronite Patriarch Khaysh, and on the move of the Vatican to force the Phalange leadership to halt the all-out attack which they had launched against his party. It seemed that he had given in to the Phalangist decision [to dominate the eastern regions of Beirut], which he had been expecting for a long time.

Some Sham'un circles say that he felt that the game had lasted far too long, and that he must give in to the Phalangist decision, surrender his arms to it, and turn into an ineffective observer within the Lebanese Front, just like Charles Malik, Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani and Edward Hunayn did, or choose another way to save himself and his family from sudden attacks and assassination attempts. Such a way would be to leave the regions for western Beirut or Dayr al-Qamar, or go to Europe, as Raymond Edde did.

Who Prevents Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil from Proclaiming  
a Separatist Mini-State?

But what are the political results of what has happened militarily? Will Bashir al-Jumayyil announce secession? Or will the state try to prevent that with support from a Maronite alliance including all of the Maronite groups, parties and families? What is the position of the Arabs and Israel on everything that is happening today within the Maronite ghetto?

What is the situation now that the Phalangist Party is in control of the eastern regions?

It is self-evident that the situation is grave, or rather fateful, as Prime Minister Salim al-Huss said. It was said in debates within the "Islamic community" and the "Nationalist Movement" last Wednesday, that exclusive control of the eastern regions by the Phalangists, control by Phalangist extremists over war decision, and Camille Sham'un's [weakened] party position mean that Lebanon is drawing very close to the edge of partition or to the establishment of a Maronite state closed to those around it and open by sea to all the foreign powers which are trying to change the Arab states into a group of fragmented, sectarian petty states.

It is said that no power would be able to stand in the way of Bashir al-Jumayyil, if he is allowed to do what he wants to do, or if he becomes in a position to impose difficult decisions on the Maronites and the rest of the Christians.

It is said again and again that the recent developments do not mean that President Camille Sham'un is absolved of responsibility, or is innocent of responsibility for driving the country to its present state of destruction and regression.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Rather, it means that the circle [of separatists] has been narrowed through the removal of Sham'un, following the alienation of Sulayman Franjyah, and that decision-making in the eastern regions has become subject to the will of one group which advocates partition by force. The shadow of cooperation with Israel hangs over its decisions. This group would take advantage of the slightest mistake or the most opportune moment to proclaim administration of its own security, as President Sarkis inferred at the meeting of the council of ministers. Subsequently, it would establish self-rule, independent of the state.

Did Sham'un Oppose Proclamation of Partition?

On this subject, it is said that Camille Sham'un twice stopped Phalange attempts to convince the "Lebanese Front" to proclaim autonomy in the eastern regions. One of these times was when former President Franjyah cut off oil from the Tripoli refinery in the north to the regions controlled by Lebanese Front militia.

At that time, voices were raised within the Lebanese Front demanding a response to President Franjyah's decision by proclaiming provisional autonomy in the eastern regions and calling on all nations to help this new regime on the grounds that its people are exposed to a war of annihilation.

At that time, Camille Sham'un opposed this attempt and warned against it, saying that the nations of the world and world public opinion would not be convinced that cutting off oil from this or that locality justifies partition and the establishment of small petty states.

The idea was buried, but only for the time being. It was said at [government] meetings that all political and military calculations had to be made on the basis that partition was coming soon, that the Arab states had to act to prevent the establishment of another Israel within Lebanon, and that such action was necessary right away. Still, everyone firmly believed that what was happening was nothing but a link in the continuing conspiracy, that no one would be able to change the slightest part of it, and that fate was fate and nothing could be done about it.

In the midst of this confusion, government officials (especially the council of ministers) became most apprehensive, for they saw that President Sarkis' republic might be the last republic in Lebanon as we know it, that the next phase was going to be one of independent mini-republics, and that what lay in store for the future could even be more serious.

What Is Cairo's Information?

The fact is that before the outbreak of the decisive battle between the Lebanese Phalangist and National Liberal Parties, reports were received in Beirut from Cairo indicating that the Egyptian regime was anticipating important surprises and radical changes in the area, was preparing itself for these events.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Observers in Beirut were unable to explain these expectations. Some turned their attention to the joint Libyan-Egyptian borders. Some thought this idea unlikely and concentrated on Lebanon.

Then came some statements by some of the [Palestinian] Resistance leaders indicating that they thought the second possibility was more likely, based on information received from Moscow, which maintained almost daily contact with this area at the highest level.

Suddenly the war of the "allies" flared up, "allies" who had stood under the leadership of the "Lebanese Front" in one trench against the Lebanese Nationalist Movement and the Palestinian Resistance.

However, we must not overlook the most important and serious factors affecting the destiny of Lebanon as a whole, the question of Palestine, the Syrian front, and, perhaps, the Jordanian front also.

This redirects our attention to the basic enemy, the most important incompatibility in the area and the Cairo predictions only days before the outbreak of the Maronite-Maronite war.

When Cairo makes predictions, it meant that it has information from effective and influential sources in Washington and Tel Aviv. More than that, perhaps Sadat himself had a role in a comprehensive plan to change and rearrange circumstances in a way that would rescue him from his Camp David predicament.

Details of the Scenario

If we proceed along these lines, we see the rest of scenario as follows: After overcoming all Maronite [opposition] forces in the isolationist ghetto, which was done when Shum'un's followers were liquidated, Bashir al-Jumayyil proceeds to complete preparations for the establishment of the separatist state without officially announcing it immediately.

That is followed by open provocation of what is left of the legitimate regime, including the president of the republic, forcing President Sarkis to step down and leave the country in a constitutional vacuum, which Bashir takes advantage of to proclaim his own republic and demand recognition of it.

Naturally, Israel would be the first to recognize it. Israel may ask Sa'd Haddad to declare his little state's loyalty to the mother state and its president Shaykh Bashir. To avoid any impediments which would hinder the establishment of the Phalangist entity, Israel would intentionally intervene against the forces of the Palestinian Resistance and the forces of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement in the south. Naturally, it would be ready to respond to any Arab reaction with a painful military blow.

According to these probable variables, Israel would reject Jordan's position, resorting to the carrot and the stick, that is, reward and



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

intimidation at the same time. The reward would be bipartite negotiations on the fate of the West Bank according to the programs submitted by the Israeli Labor Party, which Shimon Peres defined clearly like this:

--Jerusalem remains unified and the capital of Israel, with an Islamic flag over al-Aqsa Mosque.

--The occupation forces remain along the east bank of the Jordan River.

--Part of the West Bank returns to Jordanian sovereignty.

That is the carrot.

As for the stick, it would be a strike on the eastern front.

However, this scenario disregards several things:

1. The dissipation of the greater part of the Maronite character of the Phalangist leadership, especially if Sham'un himself announces a radical position. Sulayman Franjiyah, Raymond Edde, Camille Sham'un and others might thereupon find participation in a rival Maronite front acceptable, if it were established.
2. The general Arab position. Although the Arab world looks fragmented, radical changes of this type would drive a number of Arab states, especially those bordering the field of battle, to join the battle at a suitable time.
3. The international situation, which can be summarized concisely: The United States supports this plan. Europe is not involved, but seems very concerned, or perhaps opposed to its implementation. The Soviet Union is opposed all along the line.
4. The ability of the Palestinian Resistant and the Lebanese Nationalist Movement to resist and launch a long-term counterattack.

Like Father Like Son

Family circumstances are very much alike in the families of Jumayyil (the Phalanges) and Sham'un (NLP). Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil has two sons: Amin and Bashir. Sham'un has two sons: Dory and Dani.

The sons in each family have militias including thousands of young men who are a hodgepodge--as is every militia--of fanatic nationalists, religious zealots, and adventurers who use their gun to extort "protection money," or try to make a profit from anything they can smuggle or trade in the absence of legitimate authority.

The charm of the four sons: their fine, pampered, luxurious upbringing; and their adventures in "sports" cars or with women never suggested to their elderly fathers that they would some day inherit political leadership and military authority, and even surpass their fathers in defending the interests of their sect to the last drop of blood in their young veins.

44

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The similarity even extends to their circumstances in the war. While Amin al-Jumayyil declared his aversion to carrying a rifle and took refuge in his mountainous political stronghold, Dory Sham'un copied him to a certain extent when he applied himself to his business operations. Bashir Jumayyil took over the leadership of his militia, whose size is not known exactly, but is placed by estimates at between 6,000 and 20,000 fighters. It is said that he now intends to form a militia of 40,000 fighters to reclaim all of Lebanon from the leftists and the Palestinians, although that seems closer to a dream than to reality.

Bashir is characterized by his ability to plan secretly and surprise his opponents in their strongholds. That happened to Tony Franjiyah, son of former President Sulayman Franjiyah, who was killed by Jamayyil's militia 2 years ago in his stronghold with his wife, his daughter and 30 of his supporters. Dani was also surprised by Bashir's militia invading his stronghold, his villages, his ports, his home and the homes of his supporters, in a bold suicide raid which claimed hundreds of victims on both sides.

As for Dani, he bears a closer resemblance to the youths of the apathetic society in the squares and clubs of Europe than to a militia leader. He is a sportsman who cannot control his nerves at critical moments, as his elderly father does these days.

It is certain that Israel offered a great deal of arms and ammunition to the militias of both Sham'un and al-Jumayyil. However, it seems that relations between Israel and the Sham'un family have cooled considerably recently, as indicated by the fact that Dani Sham'un gave our Lebanese colleague AL-ANWAR a statement in which he said that Israel "has exploited us and is still exploiting us" to support its presence in Lebanon.

Then he added, in what resembles self-criticism: "We should not have become entangled in such firm relations with Israel, but that happened because the Arabs rejected us."

Dani received an open rebuke from the Israeli newspaper MA'ARIV, which wrote, commenting on Dani's statements: "He no longer is grateful for the well out of which he has drunk, perhaps because the charming younger Sham'un drinks from several wells at the same time and has thus turned his back on the Israeli well."

The newspaper quoted an Israeli expert who explained Dani's deviation from the alliance with Israel by attributing it to "the Christians learning that Israel would not fight for them, and would not pick the chestnuts from the fire to offer them to the Christians of Lebanon, after the latter proved (during the Litani operation) that they are not willing to help their brothers in south Lebanon and want Israel to fight for them whenever they want."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL- WATAN AL-ARABI

7587  
CSO: 4802

45

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

TREASURER GENERAL REPORTS ON PUBLIC FINANCES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Sep 80 pp 2240, 2241

[Article--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] The seminar on Mauritania's economic situation and prospects ended in Nouakchott on 26 August after several days of discussions.

Mr Isselmou Ould Babah, treasurer general of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, seized the opportunity to describe the status of the public finances in the country.

Under the influence of various factors, Mr Ould Babah said: drought, war, deterioration in the terms of trade, and unprofitable investments, the economic and financial situation worsened considerably between 1975 and 1978.

Economic growth was reduced to nothing, the balance of payments and the public finances went into heavy deficit, and a heavy external indebtedness was accumulated. However, foreign aid was very substantial, and enabled these deficits to be partially overcome.

The changes in the state budget between 1973 and 1980 were characterized, by treasurer general added, by a very strong growth in budgetary expenditures, which grew throughout the period at an average annual rate of 24.6 percent, thus representing by the end of the period about one-third of the gross internal product.

In the same time, revenue remained virtually stagnant and an ever more serious deficit appeared. In 1978, expenditures, reaching 10.851 billion ouguiyas, thus represented a little more than double the ordinary revenues, which were only 5.358 billion.

This major deficit was accompanied by a deterioration in the structure of the expenditures. Three elements in fact grew too much: the weight of the debt, the number of civilian employees, who almost doubled in 7 years, and security expenditures, whose share of state expenditures grew from 14 percent in 1973 to 32 percent in 1979.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At the end of 1978, the Mauritanian authorities undertook the preparation of a plan of economic and financial recovery which was finally adopted at the beginning of 1979. This plan, as described by Mr Ould Babah, contemplates reducing the two main imbalances: the imbalance in external payments, through a limitation of import demand and through a re-scheduling of the external debt, and the imbalance in the public finances.

A major reduction in the total amount of expenditures being barely conceivable, it is through a progressive increase in revenue and a very strict limitation of growth in expenses that this return to equilibrium should be realized, whereas the weight of the debt, the expenses of personnel and expenditures on security, should be brought to a level more compatible with the financial potential of the country. Finally, the share of the budget devoted to productive investment should be increased.

Breaking with previous practices, the treasurer general said, he has put an end to the over-estimating of anticipated budgetary revenue, to point the finger directly at the insufficiency of revenue.

Priority has been given to a survey of all taxpayers and a strengthening of the assessment and recovery services. Undertaken in early 1980, the survey was completed about June. It will make it possible to increase five-fold the total number of identified tax-payers, and to get a better idea of the tax base.

Computerization of taxes, with the creation of a card-index of tax-payers, and the recording of recoveries and balances remaining to be paid, is going to permit both the rapid processing of a great volume of data, and especially improve the strictness and the coherence of operations.

#### Augment Resources

For the future, the revision of the general tax code should be started, with a view toward simplifying it and facilitating assessment and recovery.

But direct taxes represent only a limited part of the resources of the state and their increase alone is not enough to overcome the budgetary deficit.

Fishing revenues are, along with direct taxes, the resources most susceptible to substantial increase. A new policy has been set and, in time, only boats affiliated with companies located in Mauritania or with Mauritanian participation will be authorized to fish in Mauritanian territorial waters.

A fishing law was established which will gradually replace the old fishing licenses. This law is based on the export value of fishing products; these values are now regulated and this has put an end to the fraud which existed by means of systematic under-valuation of these values.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The customs revenues are a major share of the ordinary revenues of the state, and the activity of the service has been greatly improved thanks especially to a new statute improving the discipline and motivation of the agents. The struggle against fraud was intensified, and customs revenue has continued to climb, despite certain restrictions on importation.

Finally, supplementary revenue has been found by increasing certain duties and taxes: taxes on alcohol, the tax on oil products; the TPS [expansion unknown] has been raised slightly, as well as certain customs duties.

#### Limiting Expenditures

As of 1 July 1979, 50 percent of all unexpended appropriations for equipment were blocked. Next, to prepare the 1980 budget a systematic re-examination of all endowments was performed in the greatest detail, the object being to limit waste as much as possible.

Also, supervision of accountants responsible for the execution of the budgets was reinforced, and no further recruitment has been authorized [for employment] except for students finishing their studies.

An interministerial committee for public enterprise recovery has examined, case by case, the status of the main public enterprises. Recommendations were made and measures taken to clean up the administration of these establishments and to guarantee their financial equilibrium with a minimum of recourse to state subsidization.

Military expenditures and rental expenses of the Mauritanian state (mostly for the lodgings of functionaries) were reduced to a minimum as well as subscriptions and participation in international organizations, which were limited only to those organizations in which the country has a [real] interest.

The re-scheduling of the public debt, one of the principal objectives of the recovery plan, has been achieved almost completely. This has considerably lightened the budgetary expenditures of 1979 and 1980, and in 1981 the debt service should be no more than on the order of 600 million ouguiyas.

The share devoted to investment in the 1980 budget is 100 million ouguiyas for regional development and 15 million for stimulating industrial activity. Also, a national development fund has just been created [see MTM of 29 August 1980, p 2131].

Several results have been recorded, the treasurer general indicated. Thus, the 1979 budget came out with a smaller operating deficit than the 1978, and the 1980 budget, though not yet finalized, will probably also come out with an even smaller deficit than last year's.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Even if it has not been possible for the structure of expenditures to be greatly altered, out of the primal necessity of lowering costs, nevertheless, on the other hand, Mr Ould Babah added, the re-scheduling of the debt has been almost totally accomplished and has lightened the burden of the latter on the state budget.

Investment's share could only modestly be increased because of the problems in identifying and promoting productive and profitable projects, but the reorientation toward productive sectors is nevertheless partly achieved.

Now that the country has shown its determination and its capacity to commit itself to the road to recovery, the Mauritanian treasurer general also said, its credit has gone back up. This has permitted negotiation with various international organizations, including especially the /International Monetary Fund/ and the /Arab Monetary Fund/, and the obtaining of financing programs from them.

The indebtedness of the Treasury to the /Central Bank of Mauritania/ is of the same order at present as it was at the end of 1978; that is, since a year ago the Treasury has not called upon this [means of] financing, except temporarily, and each time it was subsequently able to make reimbursement.

The public finances are suffering from more than one economic problem.

In the first place, the difficult predicament of SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Company] has reduced to a very small amount the tax revenue coming from the exploitation of iron ore. In the second place, the new fishing policy, though opening up new development prospects for the country, has nevertheless in the interim phase entailed a relative decline of revenues coming from this sector.

Finally, in a general way, the productive activity of the country has been hindered by several unfavorable factors: insufficient rainfall, a very difficult international economic environment, forcing restraint on imports and a very restrictive monetary policy.

#### The Prospects

In the medium term, the objectives remain the same: amelioration of the structure of expenditures and work on resorption of the deficit. The goal of reabsorption of the deficit in 1981 is difficult to attain, and it presumes rigid maintenance of the present austerity and a continuation of the effort to increase the state's resources: fishing rights and direct taxes, especially.

The opening up of exploitation of the Guelbs deposits, and growth in the production and exportation of iron ore, which should follow, nevertheless should bring with them a significant increase in the state revenues starting in 1984. This contributes to making possible a return to a balanced budget in 1984, which would make possible an economic take-off, which should happen then, to occur without being impeded by problems in public finance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The deficit forecast for 1980 is around 4 billion UM [expansion unknown]. With steady progress, it should be reduced by around 1 billion each year to reach the balance-point in 1984.

In conclusion, the treasurer general of Mauritania, Mr Issehmou Ould Babah, said that the 1981 budget for his country should therefore consist of about 10 billion ouguiyas in expenditures and in the neighborhood of 7 billion in revenue.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9516  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

CONFRONTATION WITH OPPOSITION ESCALATES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jul 80 p 18

[Article: "Syria: Regime Escalates Confrontation Against Religious Violence Groups; Wave of Assassinations, Liquidations and Ambushes"]

[Text] Damascus--New acts of violence have erupted in Syria in recent days at a time when the Syrian authorities have escalated the confrontation against the religious violence groups.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that Muhammad 'Utur, a lawyer from al-Hiffah town in Latakia Governorate, has been assassinated and that the body of Muhammad Ahmad Shurayqi has been found on the coast.

It has also become evident that Lt Col Muhammad Dib Mu'alla, whose assassination AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI reported in its previous edition, is a relative of Maj Gen Shafiq Fayyad, the commander of the Third Armored Division which mopped up Aleppo last March.

The little information available here on the death of Lt Col Mu'alla says that a number of his aides were also wounded. A number of people were also killed in an attack launched against an army barracks in this coastal town.

Reports circulated here also say that Maj Gen 'Ali Duba, who is considered one of the regime's pillars, has also been exposed to an assassination attempt and that two of his aides were killed and others wounded.

In Aleppo, Lawyer Muhammad Amin Idilbi, Dr Ibrahim al-Saffaf and Dr Muhammad Nadhir Zaranji, the latter two instructors at the Agriculture College of Aleppo University, have been killed.

Reports from the northern city say that a number of the regime's supporters have been assassinated in recent weeks, including Husayn Muhammad al-'Ali, 'Ali Badawi and Dr 'Abd-al-Karim Hazzuri, an appointed member of the Aleppo Doctors Union Council. The religious groups have accused Dr Hazzuri of issuing certificates of natural death for the political prisoners dying as a result of torture.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In Dayr al-Zawr, located in the eastern part of the country, there have been reports about the assassination of Lt Col Ahmad Salman, the governorate's military police commander, and about an attempt at the life of Maj 'Adnan Khadru, the airport's security officer.

In Hamah, there have been reports about a large number of those said to have been liquidated by the security agencies, including Khalid 'Abduh, Sa'id al-Fahham, Muhammad Bahir al-Shaqfah and Anwar al-Shaqfah.

Two military transport vehicles carrying troops of the special forces have been ambushed and destroyed with rockets and machineguns. Forty of the elements in them were either killed or wounded. Numerous ambushes have also been laid for vehicles of the intelligence agencies.

In Idlib, on the highway between Aleppo and Hamah, a 100 citizens were arrested during a night landing operation carried out in helicopters by the special forces. The operation came in retaliation for what had been said about the murder of more than one party official in the government agencies in Idlib.

There have also been reports about a number of prominent officers with ranks ranging from colonel to first lieutenant who have been dismissed from the security agencies, including Col Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif Nasir, Lt Col 'Ali Ahmad, Maj Muhammad Husayn Sabbagh and Lt Ihsan Shukri.

It has also been understood that those killed during the abortive attempt at President al-Asad's life on the 26th of last June included Lt 'Ali al-Duwayr from the Political Security Department.

The citizens are still circulating reports on the mass liquidation operation in which, it is said, the political prisoners in Tadmur Prison, located in the heart of the desert, were killed on the hands of the forces commanded by Col Rif'at al-Asad.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that a number of political prisoners in various parts of the country were executed after rapid sham trials and that the executions took place only a few hours after President al-Asad had signed the law providing for the execution of members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The authorities are currently inclined toward closing the borders to stop the so-called flow of "weapons and money" to the regime's opponents. The freedom of entry by Saudi summer vacationers has also been restricted. Large forces have also been directed to comb the desert between Jordan and Syria.

It has also been revealed here that the political violence operations date back to 4 years ago. A law to grant pensions to [the beneficiaries of] political violence victims has been made retroactive as of 1 February 1976.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A statement has been distributed in Aleppo in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood and signed by 'Isam al-'Attar, the brotherhood chairman, defying the recent measures. The statement says: "We defy and ridicule the measures and those who have taken them." The statement adds that the group will continue its struggle to overthrow what it describes as "the existing dictatorial regime in its various individualistic, sectarian, partisan and military forms."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI.

8494

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

BRIEFS

TURKISH 'ALAWITE EMIGRATION--Ankara--Reports received in the Turkish capital from (Kurum) say that the 'Alawite sect notables intend to appeal to the Turkish Government to permit the members of the sect to emigrate to Syria after the massacre to which they were subjected at the beginning of the current month of July and in which 95 sect members were killed and a large number of members were wounded. Members of the rightist (al-Basilan Thurkis) Party, which has religious Islamic inclinations, attacked the quarters of the leftist 'Alawites in the town before the army forces could separate the combatants. This is the second massacre to which the members of the 'Alawite sect in Turkey have been subjected in the past 2 years. [In the first massacre], 108 members of the sect were killed in the town of (Mar'ish) in the southeastern part of the country. The (Thurkis) Party had accused the 'Alawites of assassinating the party's chief official in this city of 80,000 people. Most of the members of the 'Alawite sect, a small minority in Turkey, adopt the leftist Marxist ideas. There are no accurate official statistics on the number of 'Alawites in Turkey but it is believed that this number ranges from 200,000 to 500,000 citizens. A large number of 'Alawites emigrated from Turkey and from Iskandarun Province to Syria when the province was stripped away from the motherland [Syria] in 1936. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jul 80 p 18] 8494

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

CLIMATE FOR UPCOMING BARRE VISIT AUSPICIOUS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 p 36

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet]

[Text] The Tunisians are offering France the first chance to apply the "trialog" dear to Giscard.

First there was Jean-Francois Deniau in June, then right on his heels came Jean Francois-Poncet and Simone Weil in September, and now Prime Minister Raymond Barre is expected in Tunis in October. Aside from the visit of the president of the European parliament, who was the guest of Mr Sadok Mekkadem, president of the National Assembly, these visits show a determination to restore cooperation between the two countries.

The visit of Mr Francois-Poncet especially, on the occasion of the 8th session of the great Joint French-Tunisian Commission (3-4 September), was considered in Tunis as particularly promising. The head of French diplomacy, received by Chief of State Habib Bourguiba, also had "thorough, cordial, and fruitful" talks with Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, Hassan Belkhodja, the minister of foreign affairs, and Chedli Klibi, the secretary general of the Arab League. As for the meeting of the great commission (which has met every year since 1972), it should make possible a "new dimension" in Franco-Tunisian cooperation. Specifically, what?

With Reservations

Tunisia's main trading partner (with close to one-fourth of its external trade), pressed hard by West Germany in total credits, a medium-sized investor (Germany is bigger, but also the United States and Japan have come to rock the boat), France should commit itself more in the area of production, according to the Tunisians. The French side is not denying it, since it declares itself ready to "encourage the installation in Tunisia of industrial units." With reservations, however, the French point out that they cannot determine siting for the private sector. And although talks are presently under way with French firms, including Peugeot, no new project is assured of seeing the light of day.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# A Choice

The only well-advanced project is the one on creation of an investment bank joining French banks and Arab capital. The Tunisians, who hope to see big French [industrial] groups use Tunisia as an export base similar--if smaller in scale--to Brazil, do not fail to point out, either, that this type of investment can help overcome their trade deficit with France. They hope, finally, that the prospect of Arab financing will be a decisive talking point. And add that this would be a concrete application of the "trialog" dear to VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing]. More active participation is also desired in the agricultural domain. In a general way, it would be hoped that this assistance would avoid the "sprinkling syndrome" characteristic of a "global" policy.

Intentions, obviously, are good. Do they have any chance of being realized? In Tunis it is emphasized that the [government] team in power since April is preparing a sixth ambitious [5-year] plan (1982-1986) for which "France has been chosen" (along with the Arab oil countries). It is not simply an economic choice. Since it is also based on the position taken by Paris when Tunisia feels itself threatened (the Gafsa affair, especially), and on a certain disappointment with regard to the United States. On the French side, reaction is positive. For what reasons, beyond the mere economic fall-out? Though official Tunisian circles may not like to talk much about this, it is nonetheless thought that the new course of internal policy, marked by an evident concern for loosening and liberalism, has been well received in Paris. Moreover, since the Gafsa strike, there is a sensitivity to the threat of destabilization of Tunisia. And also the concern to re-establish balance in relations with the countries of the Maghreb. All the more since, with the Sahara affair, relations remain strained with Algeria, while Morocco is experiencing economic difficulties. And also, Tunisia has found a new role in the Arab-Muslim world. The Arab League (based in Tunis), like the Islamic Conference (in Jidda), is headed by a Tunisian. Tunisia's voice is being listened to more in these times of divisiveness.

All these are reasons--political reasons--leading Giscard's France to strengthen its already traditionally good relations. Next step: Raymond Barre's trip at the end of October.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

9516  
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

HARD TIMES FOR HEDI NOUIRA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 pp 34, 35

[Article by Souhayr Belhassan--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] In the view of certain intimates of Mr Hedi Nouira, the former prime minister was out of the political scene from the day when the press maintained silence about his return (9 August) from Washington, where he had spent 6 weeks to receive [medical] treatment.

Since 26 February, when he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, his health has been the subject of many communications, both in Paris and Tunis. The weekly visits paid him by President Bourguiba nourished rumors of an eventual return.

For the first time since Tunisia became independent, a top-ranking personality has thus gone into the shadows without the press and gossip-mongers making of him an easy target. A step toward the notion of alternation in power? Sensitivity, doubtless, to the consequences of an unfortunate medical incident.

An Honorable Record

Also, as the administrator favored by meteorology [sic] and international circumstances, Mr Hedi Nouira still has to his credit the recovery of the Tunisian economy after the disastrous effects of the cooperativist experiment of Ahmed Ben Salah in the Sixties. Throughout the decade just passed there emerged a new class which holds the economic levers of the country and recognizes, at least in part, Mr Nouira as the father of its success. He also created, without ever having dared--or been able--to go all the way or even very far, conditions which resulted in political liberalism.

An honorable record, all in all, which includes black spots such as the bloody uprisings of 26 January 1978. Or the Gafsa attack which the leadership of the time--government and party, both headed by Mr Nouira--could neither prevent nor put down without foreign help.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Now if the regime has any dark spots, it is as a doctrine from President Bourguiba that they cannot be any of his doing. He has always believed, in fact, in giving his right arm considerable freedom of action, and the latter is responsible for knowing how far he can go. For having operated successively short of and beyond this limit which only the president knows, Bahi Ladgham and Ahmed Ben Salah underwent about 10 years ago a brutal fall.

Review of Small Matters

Six months after Mr Nouira went out of power, the president discovered that the prime minister's administration had not been without mistakes. He is irritated. All the more as, Hedi Nouira being in Washington, could only stew in his own juices. He nevertheless allows some blasts of ill-temper to escape him. For example, when he learns that the former prime minister has not addressed the problem of the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of a deputy (known to be a nervis [translation unknown] of the party) implicated in a customs scandal stretching over 6 years. The immunity was lifted three weeks ago, and the deputy, in protective detention, awaits the passing of judgment. Without lingering over the idea that all administration necessarily involves errors, the chief of the Tunisian state beings to hold against his former prime minister very small matters of his conduct.

At the beginning of this month, he goes to the home of Mr Nouira, and, head to head, asks him to explain these errors. The answer--/"I did what I thought best at the time"/--apparently fails to satisfy him. The president above all complains that by making him sign in blank the decree of revocation of Mr Tahar Belkhodja (December 1977), Hedi Nouira risked /"opening the door to intrigue,"/ and forced the risk to be taken.

No More Salary

And Bourguiba informs his former minister that, upon reflection, the Tunisian state cannot afford to provide the benefits owing to a prime minister to two people at the same time. Accordingly, starting 30 September, no more salary, no more vehicles, no more indemnities to Mr Nuir, a total of close to 3,000 dinars per month. No more guards, and no more sentry-box either. Important details, when one is learning to become a private citizen after having been a top-level public personality for 25 uninterrupted years.

These are, in reality, more than mere material details. These decisions cancel a decision taken last April, at the time of the nomination of Mr Mzali, and who symbolizes the change: a prime minister losing his post was not going to be thrown into the street.

Mr Nouira is not a street-fighter. Today even less than before. Handicapped since his accident, he can, after an initial stay in a hospital in the United States, make use of his left arm, dress by himself, shave,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

exercise according to the American system, to take care of himself, even though he must still walk with crutches, as his right leg still remains stiff.

Although many visitors, acquaintances, and curiosity seekers have steered clear of the former prime minister since Bourguiba's moody actions, those who have had the opportunity to talk with him find--when he really wants to talk--that he is still passionately concerned with the country's administration.

Moderate and Reserved

This man who has never been thirsty for power has tasted it since, before and during World War II, in the prison of Fort-Saint-Nicolas in Marseille, he exchanged ideas with the detainee Habib Bourguiba, eight years his elder. But whereas the leader only flourished in political tempests, Mr Nouira was already showing reserve and moderation. To the point that, for French authorities, he appeared in 1952 to be /"an important Destour element"/ who could participate in the government of the time.

He has always shown a preference for the technical and austere sectors such as the ministries of the economy and finance or the central bank which he headed for 14 years. Which led him to express serious reservations about the policies of Mr Ben Salah. Upon the latter's fall, Bourguiba thus called on Mr Nouira. As he was gradually confirmed as the successor to the chief of state, Mr Nouira was led to disagree with Bourguiba and, what is still more serious in the eyes of the president, to oppose his demands at times.

The Happiness of "Papi"

To incarnate post-Bourguiba-ism in the lifetime of Bourguiba will not have been an easy task. The former heir to the mantle will have plenty of time to reflect on it at his beautiful and rich estate of El Gobba on Cape Bon. There, he will finally be able to be himself. Notwithstanding that he neglected agriculture somewhat during his time in office, he still managed to get excited about his own agricultural cultivations. There he experimented with the latest techniques and, in this domain at least, had no fear of innovation. For this man who has never been a man of action was often depicted as beset by the problems of intellectual indecisiveness. The indecisiveness of a prudent man, impermeable to political opportunism. Of a man, too, who was beginning to show signs of age.

/"Papi will be perfectly happy as a/ gentleman farmer," say those close to him. Temples silvered, complexion clear, the face lined, the smile thin, Si Hedi looks the part. He will also be able, with that meticulous and precise mind which is his, to devote more time to making notes on his reading and to continue to pick out the paintings and objects of art with which he loves to surround himself.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

9516  
CSO: 4400

END  
59

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY